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LABOR WARFARE AND THE ANTI-INJUNCTION
LAWS
By LENNART VERNON LARsoN*
I
M[ore than any other comparable period of time the past
decade has marked a new era for the advocates of labor. It is a
decade which has seen the enactment of the federal antiinjunction law' and the National Labor Relations Act,2 as well
as other legislation in which labor has a vital interest. Several
of the states have emulated the federal government and have
passed labor relations acts 3 and anti-injunction laws. It is
proposed in this paper to demonstrate the effect of this legislation on the injunction in labor warfare.
Traditionally, labor warfare has been thought of as having
two aspects, both of which must be lawful in order that it may
remain free from injunction. These aspects are the purposes of
the warfare and the means used to attain them. The procedure
of equity courts in inquiring into the lawfulness of objects and
of means is derived from the old criminal conspiracy cases
involving labor disputes.
Whether a combination of laborers for the purpose of
raising wages or lowering hours was a criminal conspiracy at
early common law and apart from statute has been subject of
controversy. 4 At all events, during the latter half of the
* B. S., J. D., University of Washington; member of Michigan and

Washington State Bars; assistant professor of law, Baylor University.
This article is part of a dissertation being prepared for the S. J. D.
degree from the University of Michigan.
IAlso known as the Norris-LaGuardia Act; 47 Stat. L. 70 (1932),
29 U. S. C. A., §§ 101-115.
-Also known as the Wagner Act; 49 Stat. L. 449 (1935), 29
U. S. C. A., §§ 151-166.
'Mass. Ann. Laws (Supp. 1937), ch. 150A (Laws 1937, ch. 436),
repealed and re-enacted by Laws 1938, ch. 345, amended by Laws
1939, ch. 318; Mich. Laws 1939, Public Act No. 176, §§ 1-21; Minn.
Laws 1939, ch. 440; 30 N. Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney, Supp. 1937),
§§ 700-716 (Laws 1937, ch. 443); 43 Purdon's Pa. Stat. Ann., 1939
Cum. Pocket Part, §§ 211.1-211.13 (1937 P. L. 1168, ch. 294; amended
by Laws 1939, Act No. 162); Utah Laws 1937, ch. 55; Wis. Stat.
(1939), §§ 111.01-111.20 (Laws 1939, ch. 57). Anti-injunction laws
are cited note 12, infra.
' Landis, Cases on Labor Law, ch. I, pp. 4, 5; Sayre, Criminal Conspiracy, 35 Harv. L. Rev. 393 (1922).
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seventeenth century, and throughout the eighteenth, the English
common law was unequivocal in condemning such combinations
as criminal conspiracies. 5 It is reasonable to suppose that this
view was carried over to the English colonies in America and
that it became a part of the common law throughout the United
States. Since 1800 it appears doubtful that a decision has been
handed down in which the holding that a combination of laborers
for better wages and hours is a criminal conspiracy was necessary to the result.6 Nevertheless, frequent strong dicta in the
early nineteenth century indicated that this view was of some
currency in juristic circles. Since the Civil War the doctrine
has had no support, and convictions for criminal conspiracy
have been sustained because of other purposes unlawful in
character, or because of unlawful means.
7
The land mark case of Commonwealth v. Hult is
distinguished for its "liberality" of result in holding noncriminal a combination to refuse to work for an employer who
hires nonunion help and to cause the discharge of a specified
nonunion worker. Of equal distinction is its notable exposition
of the theory of means and ends of a combination in determining
whether a criminal conspiracy exists or not. 'When in the late
1870's and during the 1880's the labor injunction first came
into prominence in dealing with labor disputes, it was natural
that the theory of conspiracy be utilized.8 Whether the injunction should issue or not depended upon whether an unlawful
conspiracy existed; and the combination was unlawful (1) if a
purpose was illegal or (2) if means used to attain it were un'In this condition the English common law remained until the
Combination Act of 1824. 5 Geo. IV, ch. 95. This legislation made
legal combinations of workmen for better wages, hours and conditions. It was repealed the following year, but the doctrine that these
combinations were criminal had been weakened. 6 Geo. IV., ch. 129
(1825). Nevertheless, the English courts continued astute and
severe in holding labor combinations to be criminal conspiracies.
The latter half of the nineteenth century was well started before
definitely corrective legislation was enacted. See Landis, Cases on
Labor Law, pp. 19-23, n. 10.
,Witte, Early American Labor Cases, 35 Yale L. J. 825 (1926).

Landis, op. cit. note 5, disagrees with Mr. Witte and asserts that combinations for better wages and hours were criminal in the early
American common law.
4 Metc. 111 (Mass. 1842).
'Jaffin, Theorems in Anglo-American Labor Law, 31 Columbia
L. Rev. 1104 (1931). See Nelles, A Strike and Its Legal Conse-

quences, 40 Yale L. J. 507 (1931), for an excellent discussion of the
origin and development of the labor injunction.
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lawful. In a law court damages for civil conspiracy could not
be recovered unless an overt act was done to the injury of plaintiff.9 But in equity a showing of imminence of irreparable
injury for which the remedy in law was inadequate was sufficient
to obtain injunctive relief.
Its efficacy once established, the labor injunction grew in
popularity as a means of relief in labor disputes. It was available to private parties and did not await the discretion of
prosecuting attorneys. It was speedy, effective and flexible in
comparison with formal criminal process. Best of all, it prevented injury whereas indictments were prosecuted only after
the harm was done.
Presently in the eyes of labor evils appeared in the practice of issuing injunctions. In scope they had a tendency to
embrace activities which were peaceful and unobjectionable as
well as activities of fraud and intimidation. Further, procedural safeguards became lax, and injunctions issued on
affidavits and ex parte proofs. Feeling against the labor injunctions which was easily secured and blanket in terms culminated
in sections 6 and 20 of the Clayton Act.' 0 The design of these
sections was to tighten up procedure and to exempt certain
'Sayre, Criminal Conspiracy,35 Harv. L. Rev. 393 (1922).
" 15 U. S. C. A., Sec. 12-27, 44; 29 U. S. C. A., 52; 33 Stat. L. 730
(1914). The former section declares that "the labor of a human
being is not a commodity or article of commerce" and confirms the

right of self-organization.
"in any case between

Section 20 forbids granting an injunction

. . . employers and employees, or between

employees, or between persons employed and persons seeking employment, involving or growing out of a dispute concerning terms and
conditions of employment "except upon the fulfillment of minimum
procedural requirements. If an injunction is issued, then a second
paragraph borbids that it "prohibit any person or persons, whether
singly or in concert, from terminating any relation of employment,
or from ceasing to perform any work or labor, or from recommending, advising, or persuading others by peaceful means to do so; or
from attending at any place where any such person or persons may
lawfully be, for the purpose of peacefully obtaining or communicating information, or from peacefully persuading any person to work
or to abstain from working; or from ceasing to patronize or to employ
any party to such dispute, or from recommending, advising, or persuading others by peaceful and lawful means so to do;

. . . or

from peaceably assembling in a lawful manner, and for lawful purposes or from doing any act or thing which might lawfully be done
in the absence of such dispute by any party thereto."
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persons and activities when a labor injunction was prayed for.
Several states passed legislation following section 20 of the
Clayton Act.1 1
Sections 6 and 20 of the Clayton Act (and the state laws
following them) were interpreted and applied in ways
disappointing to labor. For reasons which will be explained in
a subsequent space, activities and persons exempt from equitable
process were severely limited. Injunctions were sued out as
easily as ever before. Finally, the insistent and continued
demand by labor for a curb on the injunction brought about the
passage of the Norris-La Guardia Anti-injunction Law.
Fifteen states have subsequently enacted substantially similar
12
anti-injunctions legislation.
'Ariz. Rev. Code (1928), § 4286 et seq. (Laws 1913[2nd Spec.
Sess.], ch. 41); Conn. Gen. Stats. Rev., 1939 Supp., §§ 1421e-1427e;
I. Rev. Stat. (1937 Bar Ed.), ch. 48, §§ 2a, 2b (L. 1925, p. 378); Kan.
Gen. Stat. Ann. (1935), §§ 60-1104-60-1107 (Laws 1913, ch. 233,
§§ 1-4); Mason's Minn. Stat. 1936 Supp.), §§ 4255-4260 (Laws 1917,
ch. 493, p. 832, §§ 1-5); N. J. Rev. Stat., 2:29-77 (L. 1926, ch. 207,
p. 348); N. D. Comp. Laws (Supp.), §§ 7214al-7214a3 (Laws 1919,
ch. 171, p. 314, §§ 1-3), amended Laws 1935, ch. 247; Ore. Code Ann.
(1930), §§ 49-901-49-906 (Laws 1919, ch. 346, p. 614, §§ 1-6); Utah
Rev. Stat. (1933), §§ 49-2-1-49-2-8 (Laws 1907, ch. 76, § 1, p. 82;
Laws 1917, ch. 68, §§ 1-5, 7, pp. 210-212; Laws 1923, ch. 93, p. 175,
§ 1; Laws 1933, ch. 15); Wis. Stat. (1937), § 133.07 (Laws 1919, ch.
211).
The Minnesota, North Dakota, Oregon, Utah and Wisconsin statutes have been repealed or superseded by anti-injunction acts and
subsequent legislation. In the following discussion the NorrisLaGuardia Act and state laws following it will be termed "antiinjunction laws". The state laws following the Clayton Act in its
labor provisions will be termed "little Clayton acts".
I Colo. Sess. Laws (1933), ch. 59; Idaho Sess. Laws (1933), ch.
215; Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933), §§ 40-501-40-514 (Acts 1933,
ch. 12); La. Gen. Stat. (Dart, Supp. 1937), §§ 4379.5-4379.17 (Acts
1934, No. 203); Md. Ann. Code (Flock, Supp. 1935), Art. 100, § 65
et seq. (Laws 1935, ch. 574); Mass. G. L. (Ter. Ed.), ch. 149, §§ 20,
20A, 20B, 20C, 24; ch. 214 §§ 9, 9A(1)-(6); ch. 220, §§ 13A, 13B
(Acts 1935, ch. 407; Acts 1933, ch. 351); Minn. Stat. (Mason, Supp.
1936), §§ 4260-1-4260-23 (Acts 1933, ch. 416); N. Y. Civ. Prac. Act,
§ 876a (Laws 1935, ch. 477); N. D. Laws (1935), ch. 247; Ore. Code
Ann. (1935), §§ 49-1901-49-1914 (Laws 1933, ch. 355); 43 Pa. Stat.
Ann. (Purdon, Supp. 1937), §§ 206a-206r (1937 P. L. 1198, §§ 1-18),
superseding and repealing 43 Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1931), §§ 202205 (1931 P. L. 926, §§ 1-3; 1933 P. L. 995, § 1); Utah Laws (1933),
ch. 15; Wash. Rev. Stat. Ann. (Rem. 1932), 8§ 7612-1 et seq. [Laws
(Spec. Sess. 1933), ch. 7]; Wis. Stat. (1937), §§ 103.51-103.63 (Laws
1931, ch. 376; as amended by Laws 1935, ch. 541, § 130, ch. 551, § 5);
Wyo. Rev. Stat. (1934 Supp.) §§ 63-201-63-207 (Laws 1933, ch. 37,
§§ 1-7), partly amended in Wyo. Sess. Laws (1937), ch. 15.

LABOR WARFARE

The plan of the modern anti-injunction law is to define
broadly the term "labor dispute"' 3 and to describe in allinclusive terms the parties 14 thereto. If a defendant is a
"party" to a "labor dispute", then section 4 of the federal law
details in a liberal vein all the activities in which he may engage
3
Even if his
which shall remain free from injunctive process.'
activities are excessive and not such as are exempt, the equity
court is not to move unless strict requirements of a procedural
,nd substantive nature are met.' 6 Noteworthy are the
requisites that the public officers must be found unwilling or
unable to furnish adequate protection for plaintiff's property' 7
1,"The term 'labor dispute' includes any controversy concerning
terms or conditions of employment, or concerning the association or
representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or saeking to arrange terms or conditions of employment, regardless of whether or not the disputants stand in the proximate relation
of employer and employee." § 13 (c) of the federal act.
" "(a) A case shall be held to involve or to grow out of a labor
dispute when the case involves persons who are engaged in the same
industry, trade, craft, or occupation; or have direct or indirect interests therein; or who are employees of the same employer; or who are
members of the same or an affiliated organization of employers or
employees; whether such dispute is (1) between one or more employers or asssociations of employers and one or more employees or
associations of employees; (2) between one or more employers or
associations of employers and one or more employers or associations of employers; or (3) between one or more employees or
associations of employees and one or more employees or associations
of employees; or when the case involves any conflicting or competing
interests in a "labor dispute" (as hereinafter defined) of "persons
participating or interested" therein (as hereinafter defined).
"(b) A person or association shall be held to be a person participating or interested in a labor dispute if (1) relief is sought against
him or it, and (2) if he or it is engaged in the same industry, trade,
craft, or occupation in which such dispute occurs, or has a direct or
indirect interest therein, or is a member, officer, or agent or any association composed in whole or in part of employers or employees
engaged in such industry, trade, craft, or occupation." §§ 13(a) and
(b) of the federal act.
" "(a) Ceasing or refusing to perform any work or to remain in
any relation of employment; . . .
(e) Giving publicity to the existence of, or the facts involved in,
any labor dispute, whether by advertising, speaking, patrolling, or by
any other method not involving fraud or violence;
(f) Assembling peaceably to act or to organize to act in promotion of their interests in a labor dispute;
(g) Advising or notifying any person of an intention to do any
of the acts heretofore specified;

. . .

(i)Advising, urging, or otherwise causing or inducing without
fraud or violence the acts heretofore specified.
11Section 7 of the federal act.
"1Section 7 (e).
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and that plaintiff has complied with all obligations imposed by
law to exert reasonable efforts to settle the dispute by negotiations or through governmental agencies.' 8 It is no wonder, then,
that an employer who seeks equitable relief in a federal court
will attempt to avoid the anti-injunction law by arguing that
his difficulty does not involve parties to a labor dispute. If he
is successful in his contention, common law principles of equity
will determine whether injunction will issue.
This background of the legality of labor warfare suggests
the appropriateness of evaluating the effectiveness of modern
legislation in giving to labor new privileges. Those new
privileges are measured by purposes and means of labor warfare which are now beyond the reach of equity. The question
pursued in these pages is: how have the various purposes and
means of labor warfare fared under the common law, under
§20 of the Clayton Act, and under the anti-injunction laws?
The recent labor relations acts will be discussed only incidentally
in their bearing upon the establishment of the legality or
illegality of a particular purpose of labor warfare.
II
In some cases where the labor injunction is issued, the
opinion is indistinct as to whether the reason is unlawfulness of
objective, or unlawfulness of means, or both. This makes for
difficulty in determining whether a purpose is unlawful so as to
make subject to injunction activities which would be free of
restraint if the purpose were legal. However, most of the cases
are clear, and fairly accurate conclusions may be drawn.
Higher wages, lower hours and better conditions have been
everywhere approved as lawful purposes of labor warfare. 19
In deciding the legality of these purposes, a court encounters a
problem of policy. On the one hand, the employer claims a
right to manage his business as he chooses and asserts that the
dissatisfied employee is free to quit and to move elsewhere. On
the other hand, the laborer points to the manifest reality that
he is not free or able to take up employment elsewhere in an age
"*Section 8.
1 See text at notes 4, 5 and 6, supra. This is true although better
wages and hours are sought than are enjoyed under competitors of
plaintiff employer. Saulsbury v. Coopers' International Union
(1912), 147 Ky. 170, 143 S. W. 1018.
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in which supply of labor exceeds demand, and he asserts an
interest in the employment to which he is tied by economic
necessity. From the employees' interest in wages, hours and
conditions of work has been derived a privilege to wage labor
warfare, within certain bounds, against the employer's
managerial prerogatives. This balancing of interests occurs in
all common law decisions, and in many under the statutes, with
respect to all the purposes of labor warfare. The problem
becomes more knotty as the purposes become removed from the
immediate objectives of better wages, hours, and conditions.
The objective of the closed shop contract, requiring the
employer to hire union men only, has relation to the welfare of
employees in the sense that it strengthens the organization which
is striving for better hours, wages, and conditions. The older
rule at common law declared this purpose remotely related to
the welfare of employees and tending to monopoly; consequently, labor warfare for it was enjoined as unlawful. 20 But a
clear majority of decisions of the modern day have stamped it
a lawful purpose. 2 1
"Keith Theater v. Vachon (1936), 134 Me. 392, 187 A. 692; Folsom Engraving Co. v. McNeil (1920), 235 Mass. 269, 126 N. E. 479;
Gevas v. Greek Restaurant Workers' Club (1926), 99 N. J. Eq. 770,
134 A. 309; Bausbach v. Reiff (1914), 244 Pa. 559, 91 A. 224; Cooks',
Waiters', and Waitresses' Local Union v. Papageorge (Tex. Civ. App.
1921), 230 S. W. 1086. See Rotwein, Labor Law, § 30.
' Shaper v. Registered Pharmacists Union Local 1172 (Calif.
1940), 106 P. (2d) 403; Cohn & R. Elec. Co. v. Bricklayers, etc., Local

U. No. 1 (1917), 92 Conn. 161, 101 Atl. 659; Kemp v. Division No. 241
(1912), 255 Ill. 213, 99 N. E. 389; Scofes v. Helmar. (1933), 205 Ind.
596, 187 N. E. 612; Grant Construction Co. v. St. Paul Bldg. Trades
Council (1917), 136 Minn. 167, 161 N. W. 520, 1055; Exchange Bakery
& Restaurant, Inc. v. Rifkin (1927), 245 N. Y. 260, 157 N. E. 130; San

Angelo v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters (Tex. Civ. App. 1940), 139
S. W. (2d) 843. A large number of decisions may be found in which
the closed shop is the objective, the prayer for injunctive relief is
based on grounds other than the illegality of the closed shop as a
purpose, and injunction is denied. Meier v. Speer (1910), 96 Ark.
618, 132 S. W. 988; Clark Lunch Co. v. Cleveland Waiters' Local
Union (1926), 220 Ohio App. 265, 154 N. E. 362; Kimbel v. Lumber &
Saw Mill Workers Union No. 2575 (Wash. 1937), 65 Pac. (2d) 1066.
The implication in these cases is that the closed shop is an approved
purpose. Still other cases grant injunction on some ground, but seem
to assume throughout that the closed shop is a lawful purpose.
Local Union No. 313, Hotel & Restaurant Employees v. Stathakis
(1918), 135 Ark. 86, 205 S. W. 450; Music Hall Theatre v. Moving
Picture Id. 0. Local No. 165 (1933), 249 Ky. 639, 61 S. W. (2d) 283;
Bomes v. Providence Local No. 223 (1931), 51 R. I. 500, 155 A. 581;
See Sayre, Labor and the Courts (1930), 39 Y. L. J. 682, 696; Rotwein, Labor Law, § 30.
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Under section 20 of the Clayton Act and under the
derivative Illinois enactment, the closed shop has been directly
or by implication approved as a lawful purpose. 22 In New
Jersey, however, the closed shop objective is of doubtful legality.
Some decisions may be cited for the proposition that the purpose
is always illegal,23 while others seem to indicate that it is illegal
only where sought throughout an industry and not as against a
single employer. 24 The Wisconsin court decided that the closed
shop was a purpose outside the scope of the little Clayton Act;
but injunction was denied because the purpose was deemed
25
legal at common law.
In all the states having anti-injunction laws, with the exceptions of Indiana and iassachusetts,2 6 the closed shop is a
'Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering (1921), 254 U. S. 443, 41
S. Ct. 172; Bedford Cut Stone Co. v. Journeymen Stone Cutters' Assn.
(1927), 274 U. S. 37, 47 S. Ct. 522; Aeolian Company v. Fisher, (Dist.
Ct., 1929) 35 Fed. (2d) 34, reversed on other grounds in (C. C. A.,
2nd, 1930) 40 F. (2d) 189; Fenske Bros. v. Upholsterers' International
Union (1934), 358 Ill. 239, 193 N. E. 112; Lietzman v. Radio Broadcasting Station W.C.F.L. (1935), 282 Ill. App. 203.
In Oregon labor defendants avoided putting in issue the applicability of the little Clayton Act to Disputes concerning the closed
shop. See Moreland Theatres v. M. P. Union, 140 Or. 35, 122 P (2d)
333 (1932); Blumauer v. Portland M. P. M. 0. P. Union (1933) 141 Or.
399, 17 P. (2d) 1115. The legality of the purpose was dubious,
especially in light of the Heitkemper case, cited note 45, infra.
Gevas v. Greek Restaurant Workers Club (1926), 99 N. J. Eq.
770, 134 A. 309; International Ticket Co. v. Wendrich (1937), 122 N. J.
Eq. 222, 193 A. 808, aff'd 123 N. J. Eq. 172, 196 A. 474 (on appeal
facts said to justify injunction); Elkind & Sons, Inc. v. Retail Clerks'
Assn. (1933), 114 N. J. Eq. 586, 169 A. 494; Dolan Dining Co. v. Cooks'
and Assistants' Union (N. J. Ch. 1938), 4 A. (2d) 5.
"The Four Plating Co., Inc. v. William Mako, (N. J. Ch. 1937),
122 N. J. 298; Lora Lee Dress Co. v. International L. G. W. U. Local
No. 85 (N. J. Ch. 1940), 14 A. (2d) 46; Heyl v. Culinary Alliance,
Local 611 (N. J. Ch. 1938), 9 A. (2d) 331; McPrehson Hotel Co. v.
Smith (N. J. Ch. 1940), 12 A (2d) 136; Christiansen v. Local 680 of
M. D. and D. Employees (N. J. Ch. 1940), 10 A. (2d) 168.
The New Jersey Court of Errors and Appeals has established no
definite rule. The closed shop seems to have been assumed a legal

purpose in Evening-Times Printing & Publishing Co. v. American
Newspaper Guild (1938), 124 N. J. Eq. 71, 199 A. 598. One employer
and not an industry was attempted to be unionized. And see Ba-

yonne Textile Corp. v. American, etc., Worker (1934), 116 N. J. Eq.
146, 172 A. 551, reversing (1933), 114 N. J. Eq. 307, 168 A. 799; 9
I. J. A. Bull. 59 (1940).
'A. J. Monday Company v. Automobile, A. & V. Worker (1920),
171 Wis. 532, 177 N. W. 867.
24Roth
v. Local Union No. 14602 Retail Clerks Union (Ind. 1939),
24 N. E. (2d) 280; Massachusetts cases cited note 67, Infra, make the
closed shop of doubtful legality.

LABOR WARFARE

purpose for which strikes and picketing may be called free from
equitable restraint.2 7 Both under the anti-injunction law and
under section 20 of the Clayton Act a closed shop controversy
seems to be a labor dispute concerning terms or conditions of
employment, and the restrictions on the issuance of injunction
should apply. Decisions holding §20 of the Clayton Act or the
anti-injunction law inapplicable to controversies over the closed
shop issue do so by reasoning that an unlawful purpose renders
a labor controversy not a "labor dispute". This same reasoning has been utilized as to a variety of purposes disapproved by
the courts. 28 Thus, the common law dichotomy of lawful and
unlawful purposes of labor warfare has cut across the antiinjunction laws and section 20 of the Clayton Act (and
derivative state laws) even though they make no mention of
motives or objects of labor warfare. 29 Criticism may be made
that the very purpose of this legislation was to prevent courts
from applying their doctrines of unlawful purposes to labor
disputes. However this may be, it must be said that the
decisions which hold purposes unlawful and controversies
caused by them not "labor disputes" under the anti-injunction
laws are comparatively few and confined to a narrow range of
cases.
Closely related to the purposes of better wages, hours and
conditions and therefore lawful are limitations on the number
of apprentices in a shop and regulations as to piecework,30 payment of wages in a particular way, 31 and the furnishing of
IEdward Lauf v. E. G. Shinner & Co. (1938), 303 U. S. 323, 58
S. Ct. 578; Denver Local Union No. 13 v. Perry Truck Lines (Colo.
1940), 101 P. (2d) 436; Goldfinger v. Feintuch (N. Y. Ct. of Appeals,
1937) 11 N. E. (2d) 910; all the cases cited notes 65 and 66, infra, permitting an outside union to picket for the closed shop may be cited
as authority for this proposition.
: See cases cited notes 67, 71, 72, 73, and 86, infra.
See Eastwood & Neally Corp. v. International Ass'n, etc., (N. J.
Ch. 1938), 1 A. (2d) 477 at 479 for a statement that the little Clayton
act has nothing to do with purposes, and if they are illegal it is inapplicable. Cf. Wilson & Co. v. Birl (C. C. A., 3rd, 1939), 105 F. (2d)
948, 951, aff'g 27 F. Supp. 915: "Section 4 [of the anti-injunction law

enumerates] certain acts not subject to injunctive relief. The test
is objective; not the purpose or intent of the acts sought to be
restrained, and not even their legality, but whether they come within
§ 4. Whether or not the strike in this case is illegal, because of its
purpose . . . is therefore beside the point."
"See annotation in 71 L. ed. 248.
"L. D. Willcutt & Son Co. v. Driscoll (1908), 200 Mass. 110, 85

N. E. 897.
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materials on a job.32

A union rule that a contractor coming

from one locality to another shall meet the union standards of
wages and hours of the former if higher than the latter is
sustained by authority. 33 But warfare waged to compel an
employer to employ a minimum number of men seems to have
been disapproved and enjoined by most of the common law
decisions. 34 The interest of employees in retaining their employment has moved them to strike and picket to compel
division of available work instead of lay-offs, 35 to compel continuance of an unprofitable plant 36 and to prevent use of laborsaving devices 3 7-all of which purposes infringe upon the
employer's managerial privilege and have been held unlawful.
Even more drastic an infringement is the demand that an
'W. F. Const. Corp. v. Hanson (1937), 250 App. Div. 727, 293
N. Y. S. 170 (decision under anti-injunction law).
'H. J. Lipman & Sons v. Brotherhood of Painters (1939), 63
Ohio App. 157, 25 N. E. (2d) 853 (decision under common law).
Under Clayton Act or derivative: Barker Painting Co. v. Brotherhood
of Painters (1927), 57 D. C. App. 322, 23 F. (2d) 743; Barker Painting
Co. v. Brotherhood of Painters (C. C. A., 3rd, 1926), 15 F. (2d) 16;
N. J. Painting Co. v. Local No. 26 (1924), 96 N. J. Eq. 632, 126 A.
399. Under anti-injunction law: Rambusch Dec. Co. v. Brotherhood,
etc., of America (C. C. A., 2nd, 1939), 105 F. (2d) 134.
" Strand Theater v. Gillen (1918), 229 Mass. 413, 118 N. E. 671;
Folsom Engraving Co. v. McNeil (1920), 235 Mass. 269, 126 N. E.
479; Edelman, etc. v. Retail Grocery D. C. U. (Sup. Ct. 1922), 119
Misc. 618, 198 N. Y. S. 17. Accord under little Clayton Act: Campbell
v. Motion Picture M. Op. Union (1922), 151 Minn. 220, 186 N. W. 783;
Moreland Theatres v. M. P. Union (1932), 140 Or. 35, 122 P. (2d) 333.
Under both Clayton and anti-injunction laws: State ex rel. Weiner
(C. C. A., 3rd, 1936), 84 F. (2d) 27. Contra under common law:
Scott-Stafford Open House Co. v. Minneapolis Musicians' Assn.
(1912), 118 Minn. 410, 136 N. W. 1092; Empire Theater v. Cloke
(1917), 53 Mont. 183, 163 Pac. 107.
In general where under an anti-injunction act or under § 20 of
the Clayton act (or derivative state law) a purpose is held illegal,
by the same token it is unlawful under the common law.
" Injunction granted in Jaeckel v. Kaufman (Sup. Ct. 1920), 187
N. Y. S. 889; Benito Rovira Co. v. Yampolsky (Sup. Ct. 1921), 187
N. Y. S. 894.
"Purpose unlawful: Rutan Co. v. Local Union (1925), 97 N. 3.
Eq. 77, 128 A. 622; Welinsky v. Hillman (1920), 185 N. Y. S. 257.
These are examples of cases wherein the purpose is so illegal as to
call for injunction against picketing but not against strikes. See
text at note 90, infra.
'Purpose unlawfully at common law; Hopkins v. Oxley Stove
Co. (1897), 28 C. C. A. 99, 83 F. 912. Injunction denied under little
Clayton Act: Bayer v. Brotherhood of Painters, Decorators and
Paperhangers of America (N. J. Ct. of Errors and Appeals, 1931),
108 N. J. Eq. 257, 154 A. 759.
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employer quit working and hire union men. 38 The establishment of a price schedule might seem properly to fall exclusively
within the employer's discretion, 39 but it is not difficult to see
a relationship between prices and wages, hours, and conditions
of labor sufficient to justify labor warfare. All these purposes
seem to call into existence a "labor dispute" involving terms
and conditions of employment within the anti-injunction law,
and it is doubtful that injunction would issue except after
compliance with its provisions. The same might be said concerning §20 of the Clayton Act and the state derivatives.
However, the cases40 indicate that some of these purposes are
deemled unlawful and call into existence controversies which are
not "labor disputes" and to which the Clayton Acts are
inapplicable.
Strike and picketing carried on to compel reinstatement of
an employee discharged because of his membership in a union
is generally considered lawful 41. Some common law authority
to the contrary may be found based on the employer's
absolute
right to discharge for any or no reason 42. Discrimination
against union men constitutes a serious discouragement of the
exercise of the privilege of combining to secure better wages,
'Injunction granted: Parker Paint and Wall Paper Co. v. Local
Union No. 813 (1921), 87 W. Va. 631, 105 S. E. 911 (common law
decision); Roraback v. Motion Picture Mach. Operators Union
(1918), 140 Minn. 481, 168 N. W. 766; Campbell v. Motion Picture
Mach. Operators Union (1922), 151 Minn. 220, 186 N. W. 781 (under
little Clayton act).
" Injunction denied under anti-injunction law: Lichterman v.
Laundry and Dry Cleaning Drivers Union Local No. 131 (Minn. 1938),
232 N. W. 639, rehearing denied, 283 N. W. 752 (1939). Contra
under common law: Ellis v. Journeyman Barber's I. U. of America
(1922), 114 Iowa 1179, 191 N. W. 111; Standard Engraving Co. v.
Volz (1922), 200 App. Div. 753, 193 N. Y. S. 831.
" E. g., cases cited notes 34 and 38, supra.
"Under anti-injunction law: Boise Street Car Co. v. Van Avery
(Ida. 1940), 103 P. (2d) 1107; Starr v. Laundry Union (1937), 155
Or. 634, 63 P. (2d) 1104; City of Yakima v. Gorham (Wash. 1939),
94 P. (2d) 180. Under little Clayton Act: Newark Ladder U. B. S.
Co. v. Furniture Workers U. (N. J. Ch. 1939), 4 A(2d) 49. Under
common law: E. M. Loew's Enterprises v. International A. T. S. E.
(Conn. 1939), 6 A(2d) 321; Walter A. Wood Mowing & R. Mach. Co.
v. Toohey (1921), 114 Misc. 185, 186 N. Y. S. 95. In both the Van
Avery and Loew's Enterprises cases, supra, the employer denied he
had exercised his power to discharge in a discriminatory manner.
"Mechanics Foundry & Machinery Co. v. Lynch (1920), 236
Mass. 504, 128 N. E. 877; Hotel & Railroad News Co. v. Lynch (1922),
243 Iass. 317, 137 N. E. 534 (not clear whether men discharged
because of union membership).
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hours and conditions. Hence, labor warfare against discrimination would seem to have sufficient legal justification.
In jurisdictions having labor relations acts this conclusion would
be certain because discrimination is generally an unfair labor
practice. Under the anti-injunction laws a labor dispute
involving terms or conditions of employment would be provoked,
43
and the lawful modes of labor warfare would be permitted.
All this reasoning would seem equally applicable to labor warfare stirred up by an employer in committing other unfair
labor practices as defined by the labor relations acts. These
other unfair labor practices include domination of a company
union and interference with organizational activity. If neither
the closed shop nor abatement of discrimination is an objective
and a union strikes and pickets to compel hiring of a particular
person, injunction has issued 44. It was thought the demand
was too drastic an imposition on the employer's prerogatives and
remotely related to the employees' welfare.
Collective bargaining has long been a bone of contention
between employer and union. There is some authority that an
employer has an absolute right not to bargin collectively and
4
that efforts to cause a relinquishment of it will be enjoined. r
But the trend of modern authority is to hold collective bargaining a lawful end of labor warfare. 46 The decisions which sustain
striking and picketing for the closed shop seem impliedly to
acknowledge the legality of the purpose of collective bargaining.
'3All states having labor relations acts (except Michigan) have
enacted anti-injunction laws; notes 3 and 12, supra. In both types of
laws "labor dispute" is defined similarly.
"Yankee Network v. Gibbs (Mass. 1936), 3 N. E. (2d) 223 (antiinjunction act not mentioned); Grassi Contracting Co. v. Bennett
(1916), 174 App. Div. 244, 160 N. Y. S. 279 (common law decision).

I Under common law: United Shoe Machinery Corp. v. Fitz-

gerald (1920), 237 Mass. 537, 130 N. E. 86; Folsom Engraving Co. v.
McNeil (1920), 235 Mass. 269, 126 N. E. 479; Hotel & Railroad News
Co. v. Leventhal (1922), 243 Mass. 317, 137 N. E. 534. In Moore
Drop Forging Co. v. McCarthy (1923), 243 Mass. 554, 137 N. E. 919,
collective bargaining was held an illegal object where plaintiff employer wanted to negotiate individual "yellow dog" contracts (i. e.,

contracts wherein the employee agrees to forgo all union affiliation

while he remains an employee). Under § 20 of Clayton Act; Heitkemper v. Central Labor Council (1921), 99 Or. 1, 192 Pac. 765.

" Common law decisions: McKay v. Retail Automobile Sales-

men's Local No. 1067 (Calif. Dist. Ct. of App. 1939), 89 P. (2d) 426;
E. M. Loew's Enterprises v. International A. T. S. E. (Conn. 1939),
6 A. (2d) 321; Cornellie r. v. Haverhill Shoe Mfrs. Assoc. (1915), 221
Mass. 554, 109 N. E. 645; Weissman v. Jureit (Fla. 1938), 181 So. 898.
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Part and parcel of any dispute in which a union is striving for
particular terms, is the end of collective bargaining. Certainly
under the anti-injunction laws a labor dispute concerning the
association or representation of persons in negotiating terms or
conditions of employment is created by the demand for collective bargaining.47 In those jurisdictions having labor relations
acts creating the right to bargain collectively, the legality of the
purpose as to the representative of the majority in an appropriate unit is beyond question.
After collective bargaining has resulted in a contract, there
remains in its breach the possibility of industrial conflict. To
compel an employer's adherence to the terms of a contract is a
lawful purpose of labor warfare. 48 The objection that the union
should resort to court procedures to enforce the contract has not
prevailed. If a union has a privilege to wage labor warfare for
better hours, wages, and conditions, it would seem to have a like
privilege to maintain a contract. On the other hand, a union
may breach its contract in one of two ways. It may be demanding terms or concessions to which it is not entitled under the
contract; or it may be waging labor warfare prematurely and
without resort to arbitration which is by the agreement to be
the mode of settlement of controversy. In either case injunction
issues at common law. 49 Of course equity will require a showing
7
Wash. Shoe Workers' Union v. United Shoe Workers' Union
(Dist. Ct., D. of C., 1937), 1 Lab. Rel. Rep. 469; S. S. Kresge Co. v.
Kitty Amsler (Dist. Ct. 1937), C. C. H. Labor Law Service, 1 16393;
Gambarelli v. Oneto (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1937), 1 Lab. Rel. Rep. 490; Starr
v. Laundry Union, note 41, supra. All the decisions discussed i.1fra,
at notes 78 and 79, which apply the anti-injunction law to disputes
between rival unions, by implication sustain this statement. A dispute between unions is a clash in which each demands collective
bargaining privileges.
'8Under common law: cases cited in 95 A. L. R. 10, 44, 45; Smith
v. Bowen (1919), 232 Mass. 106, 121 N. E. 814; Rhodes Bros. Co. v.
Musicians Protective Union Local (1915), 37 R. I. 281, 92 A. 641.
Under a little Clayton act: Greenfield v. Central Labor Council
(1922), 104 Or. 236, 192 Pac. 770, 207 Pac. 168; Atlanta, B. & A. Ry.
Co. (Dist. Ct. 1921), 271 F. 743. Under anti-injunction act: Marvel
Baking Co. v. Teamsters' Union Local No. 524 (Wash. 1940), 105 P.
(2d) 46. Cf. Jensen v. St. Paul M. P. 0. Local Union No. 356 (1935),
194 Minn. 58, 259 N. W. 811 (no labor dispute where contract
breached had e:xpired; unions advised to sue at law; injunction
granted).

" Cases cited in 95 A. L. R. 10; Gilchrist Co. v. Metal Polishers,
Buffers and Platers Local Union (N. J. Ch. 1919), 113 A. 320. Note
should be taken that where a union strikes and pickets for terms
K. L. J.-5
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that irreparable injury to business may eventuate for which the
remedy at law on the contract is inadequate. In all fairness it
would seem that an employer who may be compelled by labor
warfare to bargain collectively is entitled to the stability of the
contract into which he enters.
Notwithstanding the considerations of policy in favor of the
employer, literal reading of section 20 of the Clayton Act and
of the anti-injunction laws seems to deprive him of equitable
remedy. A labor dispute concerning terms and conditions of
employment exists; and even after procedural and substantive
requirements are met, no injunction may issue against strildng
and peaceful picketing. 50 The New York anti-injunction law
deprives courts of jurisdiction to issue injunctions in labor
disputes except upon findings, among others, that "a breach of
. . . . contract not contrary to public policy has been
threatened or committed" and that no item of relief prohibits
striking or peaceful picketing. 5 1 Nevertheless, the New York
Court of Appeals has construed the law to permit of injunctions
against striking and picketing in violation of a collective bargaining contract even though a "labor dispute" exists. 2 Perhaps
other courts will follow the lead of the New York court by construction of the statute or by declaring that no "labor dispute"
exists where labor warfare is waged contrary to agreement.
Argument may well be made that the anti-injunction law was
drawn up against evils which did not include the situation in
which an employer seeks enforcement of a collective bargaining
contract. In recent years some states have amended their labor
better than those settled by contract, the purpose seems unlawful.
Where the contract does not settle the terms struck for but it is agreed

that labor warfare is not to be used before exhaustion of other peaceful procedures, the means seem illegal.

, So held in Wilson & Co. v. Birl (Dist. Ct. 1939), 27 F. Supp.
915, aff'd (C. C. A., 3rd, 1939) 105 F. (2d) 943; Colorado-Wyoming
Express v. Denver Local Union (Dist. Ct. 1940), 35 F. Supp. 155.
Contra:Yellow Cab. 0. Co. v. Taxicab Drivers Local U. No. 889 (Dist.
Ct. 1940), 35 F. Supp. 403 (but other reasons were sufficient for
absence of "labor dispute"). No case authority has been found

under the Claxton act or derivative state laws.
51§§ 1 (a) and (f).

'The Nevins v. Kasmach (1937), 18 N. E. (2d) 294. Accord:
Greater City Master Plumbers' Association v. Kahme (Sup. Ct. 1937),
6 N. Y. S. (2d) 589; F. Everett, Inc. v. Penna (Sup. Ct. 1938), 6
N. Y. S. (2d) 630.
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relations acts and anti-injunction laws to make breaches of contract by a union an unfair labor practice and subject to
53
injunction.
To this point it has been assumed that as a part of labor
warfare waged for a given purpose some employees are on strike.
Where no employees are on strike, the familiar picketing without strike case arises. The union and its members are outsiders,
and it is necessary to find an interest in them sufficient to justify
their picketing. In most cases the objective is a closed shop, but
sometimes better wages and hours and other purposes are in
view. Most courts by their holdings have said that a union has
no valid interest in an employment relation to which no union
member is a party. Accordingly, the common law rule by a
definite preponderance of authority is that picketing without
strike will be enjoined.5 4 This same rule has generally prevailed in jurisdictions which have enacted §20 of the Clayton Act
because the courts have construed that legislation not to extend
its exemptions to outside unions.55 The rule may be made of
"Minn. Laws 1939, ch. 440, §§ 11, 14; 43 Purdon's Penn. Stat.
Ann., 1939 Cum. Pocket Part, § 206 d; Wis. Stat. (1939), § 111.06 (2)
(c). Retail Clerks Union Local 779 v. Lerner Shops, (Fla. 1939),
193 So. 529; Hotel, Restaurant, etc., Local Union No. 181 v. miller
(1938), 272 Ky. 466, 114 S. W. (2d) 501; Keith Theatre v. Vachon
(1936), 134 Me. 392, 187 A. 692; Harvey v. Chapman (1917), 226 Mass.
191, 115 N. E. 304; Lyle v. Local No. 452, Amalgamated Meat Cutters,
etc. (Tenn. 1939), 124 S. W. (2d) 701; Webb v. Cooks', Waiters and
Waitresses' Union (Tex. Civ. App. 1918) 205 S. W. 465; Safeway
Stores v. Retail Clerks' Union (Wash. 1935), 184 Wash. 322, 51 Pac.
(2d) 372. These are cases in which the closed shop was the objective.
Other purposes were picketed for in Beck v. Railway Teamsters' Protective Union (1898), 118 Mich. 497, 77 N. W. 13 (wages and hours);
Crouch v. Central Labor Council (1930), 134 Or. 612, 293 Pac. 729
(wages and hours); Fornili v. Auto Mechanics' Union Local No. 297
(Wash. 1939), 93 P. (2d) 422 (breach of collective bargaining contract which had expired).
'Meadowmoor Dairies v. Milk Wagon Drivers' Union, etc. (Ill.
Supreme Ct. 1939), 21 N. E. (2d) 308 (to change plaintiff's method of
selling milk through independent vendors to one in which employees
paid union wages sell); Swing v. American Federation of Labor
(1939), 372 Ill. 91, 22 N. E. (2d) 857; Hendrickson Motor Truck Co.
v. International Ass'n of Machinists (Il. App. Ct. 1939), 22 N. E.
(2d) 969 (for closed shop and to oust rival union); Feller v. Local
144, Int'l Ladies Garments Workers Union (Ct. of Errors and Appeals,
1937), 121 N. J. Eq. 452, 191 A. 111 (1936); Gevas v. Greek Restaurant
Workers Club (1926), 99 N. J. Eq. 770, 134 A. 309; Kitty Kelly Shoe
Corp. v. United Retail Employees (N. J. Ch. 1939) 5 A. (2d) 682
(outside union pickets to aid striking union); John R. Thompson Co.
v. Delicatessen and C. W. U. (N. J. Ch. 1939), 8 A. (2d) 130 (collective bargaining and better terms); Millers, Inc. v. Journeymen Tailors
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even broader scope. It may safely be said that the secondary
boycott and other forms of labor warfare (excepting simple
publication of the facts of dispute) without strike will be
restrained at common law and under the Clayton acts. 56
A minority of courts have been won over by the argument
that an outside union has sufficient interest to wage warfare for
the closed shope and for better wages and hours in order to
strengthen the union and to prevent deterioration of labor
standards generally. 57 Nonunion employers might otherwise be
able to sell their services and goods at price levels which cannot
be met by union employers.
Liberally construed, § 20 of the Clayton Act and the
derivative state enactments might have been held to extend their
exemptions to outside unions picketing for the closed shop or
better conditions. However, few decisions took this view.58
Union (Ct. of Errors and Appeals, 1940), 15 A. (2d) 824 (to cause
hiring of union man or to compel collective bargaining contract);
Crouch v. Central Labor Council (1930), 134 Or. 612, 293 Pac. 729
(better wages and hours); Kansas and Illinois cases cited note 61,
infra. Purposes other than the closed shop are enclosed in parentheses.
A picketing with strike case cannot be converted into a picketing
without strike case by a fake sale of the part of the business in which
the strike has occurred. Ritholz v. Andert (1939), 303 Ill. App. 61, 24
N. E. (2d) 573.
"Under common law: Texas, etc., Operators v. Galveston, etc.,
Operators (Tex. Civ. App. 1939), 132 S. W. (2d) 299; United Union
Brewing Co. v. Beck (Wash. 1939), 93 P. (2d) 772. Under common
law, the little Clayton act not extending any exemption: Meadowmoor Dairies v. Milk Wagon Drivers' Union, etc., note 55, supra;
Maywood Farms Co. v. Milk Wagon Drivers' Union (Ill. App. Ct.
(1939), 22 N. E. (2d) 962 (secondary picketing); Van Buskirk v.
Sign Painters Local No. 1231 (N. J. Ct. of Errors and Appeals, 1940),
14 A. (2d) 45; Mitnick, etc. v. Furniture Workers Union; Local No.
66 (N. J. Ch. 1938), 200 A. 553. In these cases where secondary
boycotts and secondary picketing are concerned, an independent
ground for injunction in the illegality of means may exist.
"' C. S. Smith Metropolitan Co. v. Lyons (Calif. 1940), 106 P. (2d)
414; McKay v. Retail Automobile Salesmen's L. U. No. 1067 (Calif.
1940), 106 P. (2d) 373; Lund v. Auto Mechanics' Union No. 1414
Calif. 1940), 106 P. (2d) 408; Purcell v. Journeymen Barbers Union
(Kansas City Ct. of App. 1939), 133 S. W. (2d) 662 (better wages and
hours; dicta that unfair labor practices were sufficient legal cause);
Nann v. Raimist (1931), 255 N. Y. 307, 174 N. E. 690; Clark Lunch
Co. v. Cleveland Waiters' Local Union (1926), 22 Ohio App. 265, 154
N. E. 362; cases cited note 76, infra.
"Schuster v. International Assn. of Machinists (Ill. App. Ct.
1938), 293 Il. App. 177, 12 N. E. (2d) 50; Siegell v. Newark National
Negro Congress (N. J. Ch. 1938), 2 Lab. Rel. Rep. 290. Both these
decisions are of doubtful authority for the jurisdiction from which
they come. See note 55, supra.
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Many decisions probably held or assumed that the exemptions
did extend to employees and their union. 59 It remained for the
federal courts to apply a construction most disappointing of all
for labor.
In American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Central Trades
Council O dull times had closed plaintiff's plant. On reopening
plaintiff rehired 300 out of 1600 men at reduced wage levels.
Two men struck, and large scale picketing took place. It was
held that § 20 of the Clayton Act could be invoked by the two
,strikers only. 61 As to their union and other pickets, the common law applied. A sweeping injunction issued, and while the
common law was said to permit persuasion by the union members
because of their interest in their former employment, picketing
was limited to one person at each gateway of the plant.
A logical extension of this case is the decision of Duplex Printing Co. v. DeerzgO2 which held that because defendant union
could not claim the exemption of the Clayton Act, it could be
enjoined under the anti-trust laws from inducing employers in
various states by secondary boycott not to use plaintiff's product.
The effect of these decisions was that a defendant union was not
a person who could claim exemption under tthe Clayton Act
with respect to any type of labor warfare which for some reason
was deemed unlawul. In sum, § 20 of the Clayton Act and the
derivative state laws were ineffectual in gaining for an outside
union the privilege of waging labor warfare for any purpose;
further, under the federal interpretation the legislation was
nugatory in its effect upon the common law so far as the unions
of striking employees were concerned.
",
Bayonne Textile Corp. v. American, Inc., Silk Workers (Ct. of
Errors and Appeals, 1934), 116 N. J. Eq. 146, 172 A. 551. See cases

cited note 102 infra.
(1921), 257 U. S. 184, 42 S. Ct. 72. The case arose on diversity
of citizenship.
' Accord: Bull v. International Alliance (1925), 119 Kan. 713, 241
Pac. 459; see Giltner v. Becker (1931), 133 Kan. 170, 298 Pac. 780
and State, ex rel. v. Howat (1921), 109 Kan. 376, 198 Pac. 686.
Two Illinois cases adopt in full the reasoning of the Tri-City case:
Ossey v. Retail Clerks' Union (1929), 326 fli. 405, 158 N. E. 162; Swing
v. American Federation of Labor (Ill. App. Ct. 1938), 18 N. E. (2d)

258.

U (1921) 254 U. S.443, 41 S. Ct. 172. Accord: United States
Gypsum Co. v. Heslop, 39 Fed. (2d) 228 (Dist. Ct. N. D. Iowa, 1930);
Bedford Cut Stone Co. v. Journeymen Stone Cutters' Association
(1927), 274 U. S. 37, 47 S. Ct. 522; Aeolian Company v. Fischer
(C. C. A., 2nd, 1930) 40 F. (2d) 189.
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Of aid to the employer in calling into play the common law
rule that outside unions will be enjoined from labor warfare is
the doctrine that a picketing and strike case may be converted
into a picketing without strike case by the passage of time. The
development in some courts has been that after a strike has run
for a substantial time, strikers have been replaced and the
employer's business is being carried on as usual, the case becomes
one of picketing without strike, and the union will be enjoined
as an "outsider". 63 The decisions betray varying degrees of
liberality on the part of the courts towards labor in applying the
doctrine to the facts before them.
The language of the Norris-LaGuardia Act (and state acts)
manifests a clear intention to extend the exemptions of the
statute to outside unions as well as unions representing some
employees. Sections 13 (a) and (b) define a case involving or
growing out of a labor dispute in terms of parties to the action;
and the parties are so broadly described that a literal interpretation would cause application of the law to a negligence
case or a boundary dispute between two factory hands who
happen to be employed in the same industry.64 However, all the
decisions seem to limit the scope of these sections by reading
into them the definition of "labor dispute" set forth in § 13(c).
The latter section defines "labor dispute" to include controversies concerning terms of employment, or the association or
representation of employees in collective bargaining; and it
concludes with the expression, "regardless of whether or not
disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer and
employee." This clause has been effective generally in causing
peaceful picketing without strike for the closed shop or other
purposes relating to terms of employment to be free from equitSE. M. Loew's Enterprises v. International A. T. S. E. (Conn.
1939), 6 A. (2d) 321 (careful opinion in which doctrine found inapplicable); Moore Drop Forging Co. v. McCarthy (1923), 243 Mass.
554, 137 N. E. 919; Hertzig v. Gibbs (Mass. 1936), 3 N. E. (2d) 831;
G. Loewus & Co. v. Wine, Liquor and D. W. Union (N. J. Ch. 1939),
9 A. (2d) 134; Newark Baseball Club, Inc. v. Theatrical Managers
(N. J. Ch. 1940), 10 A. (2d) 274.
"See note 14, supra. See Donnelly Garment Co. v. International
L. G. W. Union (Dist. Ct. 1937), 20 F. Supp. 767 and dissent of Judge
Otis in id. (1937), 21 F. Supp. 807, for opinions in which this possibility of literal construction is discussed. Various types of controversies are examined and found to fall within §§ 13(a) and (b)
although they are not in any actual sense labor disputes.
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able restraint.65 Furthermore, it is generally held that the
other forms of labor warfare exempted from injunction under
66
the anti-injunction law may be carried on without strike.
Two jurisdictions have come to an opposite result in spite
of the anti-injunction laws. In one the definition of "labor
dispute" leaves off the concluding expression quoted above; and
the courts have continued to enjoin picketing without strike as
a tort to which the act is inapplicable. 67 In the other the law
was interpreted to extend its exemptions at most to employees
and their union; as to outsiders injunction issued as to common
66
law.
'Edward Lauf v. E. G. Shinner & Co., Inc. (1938), 303 U. S.
323, 58 S. Ct. 578; Dean v. Mayo (Dist. Ct. 1934), 8 F. Supp. 73, later
proceedings (1934), 9 F. Supp. 459, aff'd (1936), 82 F. (2d) 554; Best
Steel Sections v. Doe (Sup. Ct. 1939), 10 N. Y. S. (2d) 920. These
are all cases in which the closed shop was the objective. Other purposes were in view in the following cases: The Grace Co. v. Williams
et al. (CCA, 8th 1938), 96 F. (2d) 478 (collective bargaining privi-

leges); Tri-Plex Shoe Co. v. Cantor (Dist. Ct. 1939), 25 F. Supp. 996
(closed shop and collective bargaining); L. L. Coryell & Son v. Petroleum Workers Union (Dist. Ct. 1937), 19 F. Supp. 749 (better wages
and closed shop); May's Furs and Ready To Wear v. Bauer (1940),
282 N. Y. 331, 26 N. E. (2d) 279 (collective bargaining); Krip Holding
Corporation v. Canavan (Sup. Ct. 1936), 159 Misc. 3, 288 N. Y. S.
468 (higher wages); Wallace v. International Assn. (1937), 155 Or.
652, 63 P. (2d) 1090 (better wages, hours, conditions). See cases
cited notes 69, 70 and 79 infra.
'Levering & Garrigues Co. v. Morrin (C. C. A., 2nd, 1934), 71
F. (2d) 284; Southeastern Motor Lines v. Hoover Truck Co. (Dist.
Ct. 1940), 34 F. Supp. 390; International Brotherhood, etc. v. International U., etc. (C. C. A., 9th, 1939), 196 F. (2d) 871; General Bottle
Co. v. Oneto (Sup. Ct. 1939), 12 N. Y. S. (2d) 348. All these decisions involve defendant unions which refuse to work on buildings or
to handle goods with which plaintiff employer has had something
to do.
" Simon v. Schwachman (1938), 18 N. E. 1 (closed shop); Quinton's Market v. Patterson (1939), 21 N. E. (2d) 546 (picketing without strike to compel employer to give his employees a half holiday
on Wednesdays); Samuel Hertzig, Inc. v. Gibbs (1936), 3 N. E. (2d)
831 (higher wages). In the last case a strike was said to have failed,
converting the dispute into a picketing without strike case. In most
jurisdictions having anti-injunction acts this doctrine will be of
no value to the employer because picketing without strike for the
usual purposes is exempt from injunction by the statute.
6'Safeway Stores v. Retail Clerks' Union (1935), 184 Wash. 322,
51 P. (2d) 372, criticized in Note (1936) 84 U. of Pa. Law Rev. 771;
Adams v. Building Service Employees I. U. Local No. 6 (1938), 84 P.
(2d) 1021; Fornili Auto Mechanics' Union Local No. 297, etc. (1939),
93 P. (2d) 422. These decisions may all be cited as case authority
for the common law rule. See note 54, supra.
In Roth v. Local Union No. 1460 of Retail Clerks Union (Ind.
1939), 24 N. E. (2d) 280, picketing without strike was enjoined on
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Two decisions which exemplify the far-reaching benefits
derived by outside organizations from the anti-injunction laws
0
and
are New Negro Alliance v. Sanitary Grocery Co., Inc.
70
In the former the New
Senn v. Tile Layers Protective Union.
Negro Alliance picketed to compel plaintiff to hire a certain
percentage of negroes; injunction was denied because the
Norris-LaGuardia Act applied. In the latter an outside union
demanded that plaintiff employer do no work himself; plaintiff
insisted on his right to work but was willing to join the union
along with his two employees. The Wisconsin anti-injunction
law was held applicable and constitutional, and injunction was
denied.
Coming within the picketing without strike classification
and approaching the facts of the Senn case is Thompson v.
Boekhout.71 There plaintiff employer determined to run his
projection machine without any help whatsoever, and defend-

ant union picketed to compel him to hire a union worker.
Injunction was granted, the anti-injunction law not applying.
In the New York courts a rule seems to have developed that no
labor dispute exists where a single employer or a small family
unit chooses to run a business without employees3 2 The policy
the ground that the purpose of closed shop was unlawful under the
anti-injunction law.
- (1938) 303 U. S. 552, 58 S. Ct. 703, reversing (1937) 29 F. (2d)
510. Accord: Siegell v. Newark National Negro Congress (N. J.
Ch. 1938), 2 Lab. Rel. Rep. 290 (under little Clayton act). A New
York decision holds the anti-injunction act inapplicable but allows
two pickets under the common law because defendant negro union
had sufficient interest to justify its action. Anora Amusement Corporation v. Doe (Sup. Ct. 1939), 12 N. Y. S. (2d) 400. At common law
this picketing would generally be enjoined. Samuelson v. Green
(1935), 168 Md. 421, 178 Atl. 109; A. S. Beck Shoe Corp. v. Johnson
(1934), 153 Misc. 363, 274 N. Y. S. 946; Texas, etc., Operators v.
Galveston, etc., Operators (Tex. Civ. App. 1939), 132 S.W. (2d) 299.
(1937) 301 U. S.468, 57 S.Ct. 857, aff'g (1936) 222 Wis. 383, 268
N. W. 273.
(1937) 273 N. Y. 390, 7 N. E. (2d) 674.
Botnick v. Winokur (Sup. Ct. 1938), 7 N. Y. S. (2d) 6; Gips v.
Osman (Sup. Ct. 1939), 9 N. Y. S. (2d) 838; Pitter v. Kaminsky (Sup.
Ct. 1938), 7 N. Y. S. (2d) 10; Miller v. Fish Workers Union (Sup. Ct.
1939), 11 N. Y. S. (2d) 278. Accord: Jensen v. St. Paul M. P. 0. M.
Local Union No. 356 (1935), 194 Minn. 58, 259 N. W. 811. Cases in
acccord under the common law and little Clayton acts will be found
in notes 34 and 38, supra.
The New York rule does not extend to corporations: Boro Park
Sanitary Live Poultry Market v. Haller (Ct. of Appeals, 1939), 280
N. Y. 48, 21 N. E. (2d) 687; nor to a business in which a large number
of employees from dishwashers to manager are represented as "part-
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of this rule appears to be that the little business man without
employees is no threat to the standards of labor and that to
hold he is embroiled in a labor dispute would be to add a burden
which, with competitive problems, might go far in causing his
species to disappear. In interpreting the statute courts have
been influenced by a policy in favor of the little business man
which does not operate as strongly for the benefit of large businesses and corporations.
A related holding is that no labor dispute exists and injunction will issue where an employer decides to wind up his business, whether because of labor unpleasantries or otherwise, and
a union pickets to compel him to continue. 73 The policy
expressed is that an employer has a right to quit without
hindrance. In this last instance and in the circumstances of
Thompsoa v. Boekhout a literal application of the anti-injunction act would seem to prevent the issuance of injunction.
A few federal cases in point so hold, stating that a controversy
concerning terms and conditions of employment and whether
they should continue is raised between the union and the
74
employer.
Still another variant of the picketing without strike case
occurs where an outside union seeks to oust a rival union with
which the employer has a collective bargaining contract. The
outside union may demand a closed shop or simple collective
bargaining privileges, and its acts tend to cause a breach of contract between the employer and the rival union. This situation
more than any other arouses sympathy for the hapless employer.
Ile has bargained collectively with a union, and yet he is harassed
by the belligerent tactics of an outside union. The solution to
this problem should permit the unions to contest with each other
but without causing injury to the employer. A majority of the
courts under the common law and under the Clayton Act (and
ners", Saito v. Waiters and Waitresses Union Local No. 2 (Sup. Ct.

1939), 12 N. Y. S. (2d) 283. Nor does it apply to a case where all
employees strike for better wages and hours, and thereafter plaintiff
employer decides to run his business alone. Baillis v. Fuchs (1940)
283 N. Y. 133, 27 N. E. (2d) 812.

"Yellow Cab 0. Co. v. Taxicab Drivers Local U. No. 889 (Dist.
Ct. 1940), 35 F. Supp. 493; Paul v. Mencher (Sup. Ct. 1938), 7 N. Y. S.
(2d) 821; Wishong v. Jones (Sup. Ct. 1938), 8 N. Y. S. (2d) 2.
"Rohde v. Dighton (Dist. Ct. 1939), 27 F. Supp. 149; Diamond
Full Fashioned Hosiery Co. v. Leader (Dist. Ct. 1937), 20 F. Supp.

467; Richard H. Oswald Co. v. Leader (1937), 20 F. Supp. 876.
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state derivatives) have approached this solution by issuing
injunction against picketing.7 5 That defendant union was
doing acts tending to cause breach of a contract between the
employer and the rival union is an additional reason often relied
upon for granting relief. Contrariwise, a minority of courts
have denied injunctive relief, asserting that defendant union
has a legally sufficient interest to strengthen itself by attacking
the status of a rival union as bargaining representative of the
employees7 6 To issue injunction, it is said, would frequently
deprive the defendant union of the only effective way in which
it could combat its rival. That acts are done tending to cause
breach of a contract between the rival union and the employer is
a circumstance which must yield to the superior privilege of
defendant union. Of course, all this is of small comfort to the
beleaguered employer.
If the defendant union actually represents some employees
and is not an outsider, the case is removed from the picketing
without strike category. The defendant union can be seen to
have a direct interest in the employee-members and in negotiating a collective bargaining agreement. Again, however, the
employer is in an unhappy situation. If he yields to one union,
he calls down upon himself the wrath of the other. The authorities are divided as to whether injunction should issue; probably
the tendency at common law is to grant equitable relief. 77 Some
The picketing without strike cases cited note 54, supra, are
authority for this proposition; also the cases cited note 80, infra;
Tracey v. Osborne (Sup. Ct. 1917), 226 Mass. 25, 114 N. E. 959; Wolchak v. Wiseman (1932), 145 Misc. 268, 259 N. Y. S. 225; Texas, etc.,
Operators v. Galveston, etc., Operators (Tex. Civ. App. 1939), 132
S. W. (2d) 299. Few cases of this type arose under the Clayton Act,
but Central Metal Products Corp. v. O'Brien (Dist. Ct. 1922), 278 Fed.
827; Hendrickson Motor Truck Co. v. International Ass'n of Machinists (Ill. App. Ct. 1939), 22 N. E. (2d) 969; and Miller's Inc. v. Journeymen Tailors Union (N. J. Ct. of Errors and Appeals, 1940), 15 A.
(2d) 824, are in accord.
7' McKay v. Retail Automobile Salesmen's L. U. No. 1067 (Calif.
1940), 106 P. (2d) 373; Greenwood v. Building Trades Council of
Sacramento (1925), 71 Cal. App. 159, 233 P. 823; Smythe Neon Sign
Co. v. Local Union No. 405 (Iowa 1939), 284 N. W. 126; Stillwell
Theatre, Inc. v. Kaplan (1932), 259 N. Y. 405, 182 N. E. 63; Nann v.
Raimist (1931), 255 N. Y. 307, 174 N. E. 690; J. H. & S. Theatres, Inc.
v. Fay (1932), 260 N. Y. 315, 183 N. E. 509; see Haden Employees'
Ass'n v. Lovett (Tex. Civ. App. 1938), 122 S. W. (2d) 230. The two
California cases are weakened by the fact that in each the union and
not the employer sought injunctive relief.
11Goyette v. C. V. Watson Co. (Supreme Ct. 1923), 245 Mass. 577,
140 N. E. 285; Plant v. Woods (Sup. Ct. 1900; Holmes dissenting), 176

LABOR WARFARE

of the authorities granting injunction are unsatisfactory in that
they rely in part on the fact that defendant union's picketing
tends to cause breach of a contract between the employer and
the rival union; thus, these decisions leave a question as to a
case in which neither union has a contract. On the other hand,
some of the authorities denying injunction are weakened by the
fact that one of the unions, and not the employer, is seeking
equitable relief. It is possible that an employer will secure
injunction in an inter-union dispute where neither of the
disputing unions will be successful in that regard. Another
reason for the paucity of clear common law authority is that
instances of inter-union disputes have only become common in
recent years, and they have occurred mainly in states having
anti-injunction laws.
Under the anti-injunction laws where defendant union
strikes and pickets to oust a rival union, a labor dispute concerning representation or association of employees clearly
exists; and injunction is denied unless the terms of the acts
are complied with.78 If the defendant is an outside union which
Mass. 492; 57 N. E. 1011 (union is plaintiff); Fairbanks v. McDonald
(Sup. Ct. 1914), 219 Mass. 291, 196 N. E. 1000 (same); Herzog v. Cline
(1927), 131 Misc. 816, 227 N. Y. S. 462; Erdman v. Mitchell (1903),
207 Pa. 79, 56 A. 327 (union is plaintiff); Mische v. Kaminski (1937),
127 Pa. Super. 66, 193 A. 410; the Rice and United States Premier
Food Store cases cited note 78. Accord under little Clayton act:
Jordan's Wearing Apparel v. Retail Sales C. Union (N. J. Ch. 1937),
193 A. 806. Contra: Music Hall Theatre v. Moving Picture M. 0.
Local No. 165 (1933), 249 Ky. 639, 61 S. W. (2d) 283; National P.
Ass'n of Steam Fitters v. Cumming (1902), 170 N. Y. 315, 63 N. E.
369 (union is plaintiff); Reform Club of Masons & Plasterers v.
Laborers' Union Protective Society (1899), 29 Misc. 245, 60 N. Y. S.
388 (same); cases cited note 76 (but see dictum in McKay case at
pp. 382, 383).
The cases above in which injunction issues on a union's petition
are decisions which imply strongly that injunction would issue on an
employer's complaint.
"Houston & North Texas Motor Freight Lines v. Local Union
No. 886 (Dist. Ct. 1938), 24 F. Supp, 619; Fur Workers Union, Local
No. 72 v. Fur Workers Union (Ct. of Appeals, Dist. of C., 1939), 105 F.
(2d) 1; Sharp & Dohme v. Stroage Warehouse Employees Union
(Dist. Ct. 1938), 24 F. Supp. 701; The Grace Co. v. Williams (C. C. A.,
8th 1938), 96 F. (2d) 478; United Electrical R. V. Mach. Workers v.
I. B. of E. Workers (C. C. A., 2d, 1940), 115 F. (2d) 488; Bergman v.
Levenson (1939), 13 N. Y. S. (2d) 455; cases cited note 79. Contra:
United Electric Coal Cos. v. Rice (C. C. A., 7th, 1935), 80 F. (2d) 1;
Union Premier Food Stores v. Retail Food C. & M. Union (C. C. A.,
3rd, 1938), 98 F. (2d) 821 (National Labor Relations Act complicated
case).
"Milk Wagon Drivers' Union v. Lake Valley F. Products (1940),
61 S. Ct. 122; Lauf v. E. G. Shinner & Co. (1938), 303 U. S. 323, 58
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pickets, the weight of authority is that a labor dispute is current,
and injunction will be denied until the procedural requirements
of the anti-injunction law are met.7 9 Under both of these
propositions it seems immaterial that defendant union's acts
tend to cause a breach of contract between the employer and the
rival union. A few of the courts have come to an opposite conclusion as to an outside union by construction of the statute and
a refusal to find a labor dispute; injunction then issues as at
common law.80 Thus, there has been ample occasion for the
employer enmeshed in a local C.I.O.-A.F.L. contest to lament
that he has been left without remedy under the anti-injunction
enactments even though he is willing to bargain collectively and
has acted with fairness to all.
By construction of the National Labor Relations Actsl
(NLRA) with the anti-injunction law there has been a promise
of relief to an innocent employer whose business is in or affects
interstate commerce and who is embroiled in an inter-union
dispute. Section 8(5) of the IhLRA vouchsafes to the representative of the majority of employees in an appropriate unit
S. Ct. 578, reversing 82 F. (2d) 68; Donnelly Garment Co. v. International L. G. W. Union (C. C. A., 8th, 1938), 99 F. (2d) 309, aff'g 23
F. Supp. 998; International Brotherhood v. International U., etc.,
(C. C. A., 9th, 1939), 196 F. (2d) 871; May's Furs and Ready to Wear
v. Bauer (1940), 292 N. Y. 131, 26 N. E. (2d) 279; Edjomac Amuse-

ment Corp. v. Empire State Motion Picture Operators' Union (1937),

273 N. Y. 647, 8 N. E. (2d) 329; Blanchard v. Golden Age Brewing
Co. (1936), 188 Wash. 396, 63 P. (2d) 372 (anti-injunction act held

applicable in terms but unconstitutional).

8 Calif. State Brewers' Institute v. International Brotherhood of
Teamsters, C. S. and H. (Dist. Ct. 1938), 25 F. Supp. 870; Trommer v.
Brotherhood of Brewery Workers of Greater N. Y. (1938), 3 N. Y. S.
(2d) 782; Stalban v. Friedman (1939), 11 N. Y. S. (2d) 343; Spinner
v. John Doe (1939), 13 N. Y. S. (2d) 449. These cases are of little
authority in the light of the cases cited note 79, supra.
In Washington the anti-injunction law was held unconstitutional
in so far as it deprived courts of jurisdiction in this type of case, and
injunction issued under the common law. Blanchard v. Golden Age

Brewing Co., note 79, supra; United Union Brewing Co. v. Beck
(1939), 93 P. (2d) 772. It has already been noted that the Washing-

ton court does not extend the exemptions of the anti-injunction law

to outside unions; notes 54 and 68, supra. These decisions make of
doubtful constitutionality a legislative attempt in Washington to
extend exemptions to the, picketing without strike case.
In Massachusetts the decisions cited in note 67, supra, indicate
that the anti-injunction law will not apply in the type of case here
discussed.
"Note 2, supra. The argument which follows may be used as
to intrastate business in such states as have labor relations acts. See
note 3, supra.
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the right to bargain collectively, and §8(3) prohibits an
employer from entering into a closed shop contract with any
union except one which is such a majority representative.
Therefore, where a majority representative has been certified,
a minority or ouside union which pickets for exclusive collective
bargaining privileges or for the closed shop has in view causing
the employer to do an illegal act. The purpose is inconsistent
with the administration of the NLRA. A few decisions have
said no labor dispute exists, and injunction has issued without
compliance with the anti-injunction act.8 2 A logical implication
of these decisions is that even where a union is not certified but
is proved to be in the majority, the minority or outside union
may be restrained from waging warfare for the closed shop or
exclusive bargaining privileges. In this latter situation, however, the bulk of decisions hold that a labor dispute exists and
that procedural requirements of the anti-injunction laws must
be satisfied.8 3 In fact, their language is such as to make doubtful the authority of those decisions which have granted injunction where a minority union demands a closed shop or collective
bargaining privileges as against a certified majority union.
The employer's prospects under the NLRA of deducing a right
Oberman & C. v. United Garment Workers of America (Dist.
Ct. 1937), 21 F. Supp. 20; Union Premier Food Stores v. Retail Food
C. & M. Union (C. C. A., 3rd, 1938), 98 F. (2d) 821; Bloedel Donovan
Lumber Mills v. International, etc. (Wash. 1940), 102 P. (2d) 270; see
Cupples Co. v. American Federation of Labor (Dist. Ct. 1937), 20 F.
Supp. 894, 897, 899.
An amendment to the Pennsylvania anti-injunction act declared
that the act shall not apply where a union engages in a course of conduct calculated to coerce an employer to violate the NLRA or Pennsylvania labor relations law. 43 Purdon's Penn. Stat. Ann., 1939
Cum. Pocket Part, § 206d.
'Lund v. Woodenware Workers Union (Dist. Ct. 1937), 19 F.
Supp. 607; Blankenship v. Kurfman (C. C. A., 7th, 1938), 96 F. (2d)
450; Donnelly Garment Co. v. International L. G. W. Union (C. C. A.,
8th, 1938), 99 F. (2d) 309 and 21 F. Supp. 807 (dissenting opinion);
Grace Co. v. Williams (C. C. A., 8th, 1938), 96 F. (2d) 478; Fur Workers Union Local No. 72 v. Fur Workers Union (Ct. of App., D. of C.,
1939), 105 F. (2d) 1; United Electrical R. v. Mach. Workers v. I. B.
of E. Workers (C. C. A., 2nd, 1940), 115 F. (2d) 488 (plaintiff majority union fails to recover damages of defendant minority union);
Pauly Jail Bldg. Co. v. International Ass'n (Dist. Ct. 1939), 29 F.
Supp. 15; Houston & North Texas M. F. Lines v. Local Union No. 886
(Dist. Ct. 1938), 24 F. Supp. 619; Cupples Co. v. American Federation
of Labor (Dist. Ct. 1937), 20 F. Supp. 894. Wis. Stat. (1937),
§§ 111.09(1) and 11.17 preserved the rights of minority groups to
wage labor warfare in Wisconsin; for legislative changes see notes
148 and 149, infra.
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vindicated in equity against the vicissitudes of inter-union warfare are dubious in the face of the broad definitions of the antiinjunction laws.
Remaining for discussion are a variety of controversies to
which the anti-injunction acts are literally applicable but which
exhibit purposes or circumstances clearly removing them from
the public policy of the legislation. It has been noted that a
controversy between A and B, owners of two factories, concerning a sale and purchase of real estate; or concerning A's demand
that B pay his employees higher wages in order to even conditions of competition; or, concerning A's demand that B purchase
A's factory; is one to which the Norris-LaGuardia Act is
literally applicable.8 4' The same may be said as to a fence
dispute between X and Y both of whom happen to be employees
of A. s 4b It may be said as to a demand by Z union of A for
$100,000 to be paid into the union treasury.8 4' Also it may be
said as to the demand by a group of unemployed that A hired
them.4d Sections 13(a) and (b) of the Norris-LaGuardia Act
define a case involving or growing out of a labor dispute in terms
of parties to the litigation irrespective of the subject matter of
the dispute.8 5 To confine the legislation to the objects of public
policy intended it is necessary to read into §§ 13(a) and (b) the
definition of "labor dispute" found in § 13(c), and all the
decisions do just that. Hence the examples cited are probably
not within the scope of the anti-injunction law.
Malicious labor warfare for no other purpose than to injure
a business or to drive it from competition with other businesses
will probably not be deemed a labor dispute and will be enjoined
under the common law.8 6 If an employer is willing to meet all
84 dDonnelly Garment Co. v. International L. G. W. Union (Dist.
Ct. 1937), 20 F. Supp. 767, 769, 770, 772.

Note 14, supra.
Service Corporation v. Courtney (C. C. A., 7th,
1936), 85 F. (2d) 825; Yellow Cab 0. Co. v. Taxicab Drivers Local
U. No. 889 (Dist. Ct. 1940), 35 F. Supp. 403; United States v. Norris
(Dist. Ct. 1918), 255 F. 423 (Clayton Act, § 20, not applicable); Herzog v. Cline (1927), 131 Misc. 816, 227 N. Y. S. 462 (common law);
Falciglia v. Gallagher (1937), 299 N. Y. S. 890; see National P. Ass'n
of Steamfitters v. Cumming (1902), 170 N. Y. 315, 63 N. E. 369.
In Busch Jewelry Co. v. United Retail E. Union Local 830 (1938),
7 N. Y. S. (2d) 872, a fake union organized to take up the activities
of another union which had been enjoined was denied the exemption

"Scavenger

of the anti-injunction law. See also Hoffman's Vegetarian Restaurant Co., Inc. v. Lee (1939), 10 N. Y. S. (2d) 287.
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union standards and still is picketed, the inference is that the
labor warfare is malicious. A related type of case is one where
a union combines with an employer to wage warfare against
other businesses to drive out competition.8 7 Again union
standards are not in controversy and probably no "labor
dispute" exists. Still another type of case to which the antiinjunction law is inapplicable is that in which a business
organization assumes to practice methods of labor warfare to
attain mercantile ends.8 8 There is also the possibility that a
union which has closed its membership unreasonably may not
claim the benefits of the legislation where it pickets to cause
an excluded worker to be discharged. s 9
All the cases here discussed demonstrate that the antiinjunction laws have measurably broadened the area of labor
di pute in which equitable restraint will not issue except after
fulfillment of stringent procedural requirements. But they
demonstrate also that there is a residue of flagrantly unlawful
purposes and special circumstances which render a case not a
"labor dispute." In these latter cases injunction issues as at
common law.
III.
Assuming the legality of purposes and existence of a labor
dispute, what forms may labor warfare take under the antiinjunction acts as compared with those permitted under the
common law and Clayton acts? This question is complicated by
the circumstance that at common law it occasionally appears
that all the lawful methods may be permitted for one purpose
whereas a more restricted number may be permitted for
another.0 0 While measuring the permitted means according to
the objects of the union may have policy to commend it, this
viewpoint is inconsistent with common law theory. If a labor
'U. S. Lumber Institute (Dist. 1940), 35 F. Supp. 191 (indictment

under Sherman Act).

8 Columbia River Packers Ass'n v. Hinton (Dist. Ct. 1939), 34 F.
Supp. 970; Fillett v. Batolomio (App. Div. 1938), 1 N. Y. S. (2d) 316;
People v. Distributors Division (1938), 7 N. Y. S. (2d) 185 (association of distributors enjoined from picketing to compel producers to
sell to, and retailers to buy from, the association only); Stolper v.
Straughn (1940), 23 N. Y. S. (2d) 604.
" Dorrington v. Manning (Pa. Super. Ct. 1939), 4 A. (2d) 886.

9 E. g., possibly a court will enjoin secondary picketing or secondary boycott for the closed shop but permit picketing and strike;
whereas for higher wages all these methods may be permitted. Cf.
cases cited note 36, supra; notes 93, 113, 123, and 131, infra.

KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL

dispute is for an unlawful purpose, all concerted efforts
(possibly excepting simple publication of the facts) are enjoinable; this is by far the most usually applied rule.0 1 In general,
then, in cases where the purpose is lawful are to be found the
limits of lawful warfare.
02
Everywhere and under all legislation the strike is lawful.
Some decisions have said a strike for any purpose may not be
enjoined.0 3 These decisions seem to confuse the right of an
individual to quit work and the privilege of a union to strike.
Equitable principles, as well as constitutional doctrine concerning involuntary servitude, prevent injunction against exercising
the former right.0 4 But calling a concerted strike is the exercise
of a power of a union which has often been enjoined where the
purpose is unlawful."5
Most often the form of labor warfare which provokes the
employer to seek equitable relief is picketing. Picketing may
be defined as patrolling activities carried on at or near an
employer's place of business which are intended to inform
employees and customers of the existence of a labor dispute and
to persuade them to cease dealing with the employer. There is
older authority that all picketing is unlawful, 96 but today the
In addition to cases heretofore cited wherein purposes have
been declared unlawful, see citation of 'authority in 11 Am. Jur. 543;
12 C. J. 591; see also Jaffin, Theorems in Anglo-American Labor Law,
(1931) 31 Col. L. Rev. 1104.
'-No authority need be cited for this proposition. Most of the
common law cases heretofore cited in which injunctions are denied
involve strikes. The anti-injunction laws and the Clayton Act (and
state derivatives) all sanction the strike. See notes 10 and 15, supra.
' New Bedford Fish Co. v. United Sea Workers of Philadelphia
(U. S. Dist. Ct., E. D. Pa., 1938), 2 Lab. Rel. Rep. 589 (decision under
Norris-LaGuardia Act); Parkinson Co. v. Building Trades Council
(1908), 154 Cal. 581, 98 Pac. 1927; Walter A. Wood Mowing & R.
Machine Co. v. Toohey (1921), 114 Misc. 185, 186 N. Y. S. 95 (1921);
National P. Ass'n of Steamfitters v. Cumming (1902), 150 N. Y. 315,
63 N. E. 369.
Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence (4th ed.), §§ 1710-1712.
'Thomas v. Cincinnati, N. 0. & T. P. R. Co. (1894), 62 Fed. 803;
R. An W. Hat Shop, Inc. v. Sculley (1922), 98 Conn. I, 118 A. 55;
Service Wood Heel Co. v. Mackey (Me. 1936), 199 N. E. 400; Yankee
Network v. Gibbs (Mass. 1936), 3 N. E. (2d) 228; W. A. Snow Iron
Works v. Chadwick (1917), 227 Mass. 382, 116 N. E. 801; N. J. Printing Co. v. Local No. 26 (1923), 95 N. J. Eq. 108, 122 Atl. 622; Schlang
v. Ladies Waist Makers' Union (1910), 67 Misc. 221, 124 N. Y. S. 289;
Erdman v. Mitchell (1903), 207 Pa. 79, 56 A. 327.
'Atchinson, T. & S. F. Ry. v. Gee (Dist. Ct. 1905), 139 Fed. 528;
Moore v. Cooks, Waiters' and Waitresses' Union (1919), 39 Cal. App.
538, 179 Pac. 417; Ellis v. Journeyman Barbers' I. U. of America
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common law authorities are virtually unanimous in agreeing
that picketing can be peaceful and lawful. 97 The anti-injunction acts exempt from equitable restraint giving publicity to a
labor dispute by patrolling, and the cases decided under them
are without exception in permitting picketing. 98
The Clayton Act and state derivatives prohibit injunctions
directed against peacefully persuading persons to strike or to
cease patronizing an employer or against attending at any place
for the purpose of peacefully obtaining or communicating
information.99 This would appear to permit peaceful picketing,
but the United States Supreme Court decision of Truax v. Corrigan10 had a severely restrictive effect on the judicial concept
of what is peaceful picketing. Close reading of all the opinions
in the United States Supreme Court and in the Arizona Supreme
Court (from which the case came) impresses one that the prevailing opinion understood the facts to be that the picketing was
abusive, coercive and uproarious and that the circulars distributed were false and intimidating. On these facts, statutory
denial of injunction to an employer against the pickets might
well be violative of due process and equal protection of the laws
of the state. The dissenters, Justices Holmes and Brandeis, as
well as the state supreme court, assumed the facts to show no
(1922), 194 Iowa 1170, 191 N. W. 111; Beck v. Railway Teamsters
Protective Union (1898), 118 Mich., 497, 77 N. W. 13; Elkind & Sons,
Inc. v. Retail Clerks Assn. (1933), 114 N. J. Eq. 586, 169 A. 494;
Webb v. Cooks' Waiters' and Witresses' Union Tex. Civ. App. 1918),
205 S. W. 465; Jensen v. Cooks' & Waiters' Union (1905), 39 Wash.
531, 81 Pac. 1069.
" Riggs v. Tucker Duck & Rubber Co. (Ark. 1938), 119 S. W.
(2d) 507; E. M. Loew's Enterprises v. International A. T. S. E. (Conn.
1939), 6 A. (2d) 321; Hughes v. Kansas City Motion Picture M. 0.
Local 170 (Mo. 1920), 221 S. W. 95, 282 Mo. 304; Empire Theater Co.
v. Cloke (1917), 53 Mont. 183, 163 Pac. 107; Steffes v. Motion Picture
Machine Operators Union of Minneapolis (1917), 136 Minn. 200, 161
N. W. 524; White Mountain Freezer Co. v. Murphy (1917), 78 N. H.
398, 101 A. 357; Exchange Bakery & Restaurant v. Rifkin (1927),
245 N. Y. 260, 157 N. E. 130; Kirmse v. Adler (1933), 311 Pa. 78, 166

A. 566; Carpenters and Joiners Union v. Ritter's Cafe (Tex. Civ. App.

1940), 138 S. W. (2d) 233; Kimbel v. Lumber & Saw Mill Workers
Union No. 2575 (Wash. 1937), 65 P. (2d) 1066. Kentucky has
enacted a statute declaring that peaceful picketing is lawful. L. 1940,
S. B. No. 268, Art 3, Sec. I.
"Note 15, supra. Nearly all the cases earlier cited in which a
labor dispute was found current and in which injunction was denied
involved picketing.
'Note 19, supra.
3 (1921) 257 U. S. 312, 42 S. Ct. 124, reversing 570 (1918) 20

Ariz. 7, 176 Pac. 570.
K. L. J.-6
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unruly patrolling, and they argued that the statutes did nothing
more than to legalize, or to confirm the legality of, peaceful
picketing. The effect of this decision was to cast a doubt as to
the constitutionality of a little Clayton act if it were construed
to permit picketing too broadly. In consequence, the number of
pickets and type of activities permitted under the acts were very
much limited during the 1920's.101 But in the last decade a
liberalization in judicial notions as to peaceful picketing is
noticeable.' 02
It is to be noted that the rule that peaceful picketing is lawful prevails although this activity has the effect of persuading
customers to cease to patronize the employer. Further, it has
the intended effect of causing employees or would-be employees
to cease working for the employer. Common law authority
exists that an employer has sufficient property interest in an
employment for a term 0 3 or at will' 0 4 to have an action in
equity to prevent interference with that relationship. But this
authority seems of little force today in view of the virtually
unanimous holdings that peaceful picketing will not be enjoined.
The "yellow dog" contracts, in which an employee promised
not to join a union or to quit work when he did, was a device
utilized to discourage unionization. It also was a basis for
injunction to prevent persuasions-including picketing-causing employees to breach their "yellow dog" contracts. 0 5
'01 E. g., Greenfield v. Central Labor Council (1922), 104 Or. 236,
192 Pac. 770, 207 Pac. 168.
3 That picketing may be peaceful and lawful under the Clayton
Act is well established. Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Local Great Falls
Lodge of I. A. of M., (Dist. Ct. 1922), 283 F. 557; Fenske Bros. v.
Uphosterers' International Union (1934), 358 Ill. 239, 193 N. E. 112;
Bayonne Textile Corp. v. American, etc., Silk Workers (Ct. of Errors
and Appeals 1934), 116 N. J. Eq. 146, 172 A. 551; Blumauer v. Portland M. P. M. 0. P. Union (1933), 141 Or. 399, 17 P. (2d) 1116.
' United Shoe Machinery Corp. v. Fitzgerald (1921), 237 Mass.
537, 130 N. E. 86; Rice, Barton v. Fales Machine, etc., Co. v. Willard
(1922), 242 Mass. 566, 136 N. E. 629; Walton Lunch Co. v. Kenney
(1920), 236 Mass. 310, 128 N. E. 429.
' Vegelahn v. Guntner (1896), 167 Mass. 92, 44 N. E. 1077; Jonas
Glass Co. v. Glass Bottle Blowers' Assn. (1910), 77 N. J. Eq. 219, 79 A.
262; Thacker Coal Co. v. Burke (1906), 59 W. Va. 253, 53 S. E. 161.

See cases cited Landis, Cases on Labor Law, p. 81, n. 1.
In Diamond Black Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers (1920), 188
Ky. 477, 222 S. W. 1079, injunction was denied against peaceful persuasions of employees at will to join a union where the policy of the

employer was to discharge union men.
' Hitchman Coal Co. v. Mitchell (1917), 245 U. S. 229, 38 S. Ct.
65; Gassaway v. Borderland Coal Corporation (C. C. A., 7th, 1921),
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Today practically all the anti-injunction laws contain a provision declaring the "yellow dog" contract unenforceable and
no basis for equitable relief.10 0 States without anti-injunctioi
legislation as well have enacted similar provisions.' 0 7 It may
safely be said that the "yellow dog" contract has diminished to
the vanishing point in legal efficacy.
Of course, threatening and violent picketing as well as mass
picketing are enjoinable under the anti-injunction acts, the
Clayton Act and under the common law.'0 s False and intimidating placards and banners carried by pickets will also be enjoined
under the common law and under the legislation mentioned. 10 9
The differences between the plaintiff employer's condition
before and under the anti-injunction acts is that under the
latter he must comply with stringent procedural requirements
and will find that judicial attitudes toward permissible picketing have been liberalized. However, it must be said that how
readily findings of intimidation will be made and on how satisfactory a proof depend in some degree on the discretion of the
trial judge who may or may not be favorably disposed toward
labor activities.
Because peaceful picketing is carried on to communicate
facts as well as to persuade, claims that it is constitutionally
protected as an exercise of the right of free speech have been
put forth. These claims to a substantial extent have been
sustained by recent United States Supreme Court holdings that
278 Fed. 56; International Organization, U. M. W. A. v. Red Jacket
Consolidated Coal & Coke Co. (C. C. A., 4th, 1937), 18 F. (2d) 839;
Thacker Coal Co. v. Burke, Cited note 104.
' § 3 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act.
"'E. g., Ariz. Rev. Code, 1934 Supp., § 1360a; Calif Labor Code of
1937, §§ 920-923; Conn. Rev. Stat. (1930), § 6209; Ill. State Bar Stat.
(1939), ch. 48, § 2b.
"Newton v. LaClede Steel Co. (C. C. A., 7th, 1935), 80 F. (2d)
636; Fenske Bros. v. Upholsterers' International Union (1934), 358
Ill. 239, 193 N. E. 112; Bull v. International Alliance (1925), 119 Kan.
713, 241 Pac. 459; Underhill v. Murray (1904), 117 Ky. 640, 78 S. W.
482; Busch Jewelry Co. v. United R. E. Union (1939), 281 N. Y. 150,
22 N. E. (2d) 320; Wallace v. International Ass'n (1937), 155 Or.
673, 63 P. (2d) 1090.
Violent or intimidating picketing is generally a criminal offense.
Commonwealth v. Ramey (Ky. Ct. of Appeals, 1939), 132 S. W. (2d)
342.
", Yellow Cab 0. Co. v. Taxicab Drivers Local U. No. 889 (Dist.
Ct. 1940), 35 F. Supp. 403; May's Furs and Ready to Wear v. Bauer
(1940), 282 N. Y. 331, 26 N. E. (2d) 279; Busch Jewelry Co. v. United
R. E. Union (1939), note 108, supra; Wiest v. Dirks (Ind. 1939), 20
N. E. (2d) 969.
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state laws forbidding all picketing are unconstitutional as
violative of rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. 110
The exact bounds of constitutionally protected picketing are
still not clear. It cannot be said definitely that picketing without strike in a "labor dispute" as that term has been interpreted
in federal decisions is constitutionally protected."1
But
certainly peaceful picketing with strike for the usual purposes
may not be prohibited or curtailed unreasonably by state action
-legislative or judicial.
Publication of the facts of a dispute coupled with persuasion in newspapers, or by word of mouth or by signs away
from the location of the dispute is not what is ordinarily thought
of as picketing. Under the common law decisions permitting
peaceful picketing, this method of labor warfare is clearly lawful. The anti-injunction acts and the Clayton acts merely confirm pre-existing law in forbidding restraint against general
publication of the facts of a dispute.11 2 Even in jurisdictions
where picketing without strike would be enjoined, it would seem
that the outside union could exercise its right of free speech and
press by publicizing the facts of the controversy. 1' 3 The same
might be said about a strike for the closed shop in a jurisdiction
where the strikers are not permitted to picket for that purpose.

' Thornhill v. State of Alabama (1940), 60 S. Ct. 736; Carlson v.
People of State of California (1940), 60 S. Ct. 746. Accord: People
v. Harris (Colo. 1939), 91 P. (2d) 989; American Federation of Labor
v. Bain (Ore. 1940), 106 P. (2d) 544; San Angelo v. Amalgamated
Meat Cutters (Tex. Civ. App. 1940) 139 S. W. (2d) 843.
' Swing v. American Federation of Labor (1939), 372 Ill. 91, 22
N. E. (2d) 857 (injunction granted); first dissent in McKay v. Retail
Automobile Salesmen's L. U. No. 1067 (Calif. 1940), 106 P. (2d) 373.
For decisions which apparently hold that peaceful picketing will not
be enjoined whatever the purpose, see French Sardine Co. v. Deep
Sea Purse Seine Fisherman's Union (Calif. Super. Ct. 1938), 2 Lab.
Rel. Rep. 840; Thompson v. Boekhout, 291 N. Y. S. 572, 249 App. Div.
77, afT'd (1937), 273 N. Y. 390, 7 N. E. (2d) 674; Bieber v. Bininbaum
(1938), 6 N. Y. S. (2d) 63.
'Notes 10 and 15, supra;Lietzman v. Radio Broadcasting Station
WCFL (1935), 282 ]l1. App. 203; Smythe Neon Sign Co. v. Local Union
No. 405 (Iowa, 1939), 284 N. W. 126; Dehan v. Hotel and Restaurant
Employees (La. Ct. of App. 1936), 159 So. 637; Evening Times Picketing & Publishing Co. v. American Newspaper Guild (N. J. Ct. of
Errors and Appeals, 1938), 199 A. 598.

"'John R. Thompson Co. v. Delicatessence and C. W. U. (N. J.

Ch. 1939), 8A. (2d) 130.
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Where the right is abused, the usual remedy is by law action for
114
But authority
slander or libel rather than by suit in equity.
exists both at common law and under the legislation here discussed that false, abusive and intimidating publication will be
In most instances such injunction issues in connecenjoined.1n
tion with violent or intimidating picketing.
If the bounds of lawful picketing are transgressed, the
normal rule has been to enjoin that which is unlawful. But
there is substantial authority under the common law and under
the little Clayton acts that violent or intimidating picketing forfeits the entire privilege." 6 Decisions so holding under the
latter acts may be criticized on the ground that § 20 of the
Clayton Act provides and was intended to declare that when
injunction issues in a proper case, it shall not restrain peaceful picketing. Similarly, the anti-injunction laws permit of
injunction against intimidation after procedural requirements
are met but are scrupulous to forbid it against peaceful picketing. Nevertheless, in the New York court the development has
been that where a finding is made that any picketing carried on
will be violent and threatening, then all picketing will be
7
restrained."
Closely related to mass picketing is the sit-down strike.
The right to picket does not include the right to trespass, and
trespasses which have been repeated and which are threatened
may be enjoined on proper allegation of irreparable injury and
'Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence (4th edition), §§ 1895, 20502052.
1 Authorities cited note 112, supra;Pauly Jail Bldg. Co. v. International Ass'n (Dist. Ct. 1939), 29 F. Supp. 15; Yellow Cab 0. Co. v.
Taxicab Drivers Local U. No. 889 (Dist. Ct. 1940), 35 F. Supp. 403;
Wiest v. Dirks (Ind. 1939), 20 N. E. (2d) 969; Olympia Operating
Co. v. Costello (1932), 278 Mass. 125, 179 N. E. 804; Nann v. Raimist
(1931), 255 N. Y. 307, 174 N. E. 690; J. H. & S. Theatres, Inc. v. Pay
(1932), 260 N. Y. 315, 183 N. E. 509; Carter v. Bradshaw (Tex. Civ.
App. 1940), 138 S. W. (2d) 187.
-1Common law: Local Union No. 313 Hotel & Restaurant Employees v. Stathakis (1918), 135 Ark. 86, 205 S. W. 450; Nann v.
Raimist (1931), 255 N. Y. 307, 174 N. E. 690; Bomes v. Providence
Local No. 223 (1931), 51 R. I. 500, 155 A. 581. Little Clayton acts:
Ossey v. Retail Clerk's Union (1927), 326 fli. 405, 158 N. E. 162; Bull
v. International Alliance (1925), 119 Kan. 713, 241 Pac. 459.
n7 Busch Jewelry Co. v. United Retail Employee's Union Local
830 (1939), 281 N. Y. 150, 22 N. E. 320; Baills v. Fuchs (1940), 283
N. Y. 133, 27 N. Y. (2d) 812.
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inadequate damages at law. 1 18 Hence, it is clearly established
under the common law and under all legislation that the sitdown strike may be enjoined. 1 9 Under the Clayton acts and
the anti-injunction laws procedural requirements should be met
before relief is obtained, but there is authority that the sit-down
strike is so beyond legal justification that injunction will issue
1 20
as at common law.
Another method of industrial warfare about which there is
much discussion is the secondary boycott. A remarkable confusion characterizes the learning about the secondary boycott
because of the manifold activities to which the term is applied.
A Wisconsin statute 121 fairly accurately definies it as a "conspiracy to cause injury to one with whom no labor dispute
exists, whether by (a) withholding patronage, labor, or other
beneficial business intercourse, (b) picketing, (c) refusing to
handle, install, use or work on particular materials, equipment
or supplies, or (d) by any other unlawful means, in order to
bring him against his will into a concerted plan to coerce or
inflict damage upon another". Ordinary picketing has the
effect of causing third persons-employees, would-be employees
and customers-to cease dealing with the employer, but it is
distinguished from the secondary boycott in that the latter is
carried on away from the employer's premises and is directed
at persons other than present or prospective employees. The
simple or primary boycott is distinguished in that it is an agreement by the union workers, express or implied, not to patronize
'Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence, § 1907 et seq; Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Brosseau (Dist. Ct. 1923), 286 F. 414. In Boise Street
Car Co. v. Van Avery (Ida. 1940), 103 P. (2d) 1107, injunction issued
under an anti-injunction law to prevent defendant union from
infringing on plaintiff's bus franchise by running "courtesy cars".
' The Oakmar (Dist. Ct. 1937), 20F. Supp. 650; The Losmar
(1937), 20 F. Supp. 887; Plecity v. Local No. 37 of Int. Union of
Bakery Workers (Calif. Super. Ct. 1937), 4 U. S. Law Week 898;
Fansteel Metallurgical Corp. v. Lodge 667 of the Amalganated Assn.
of I. S. & T. Workers (Ill. App. Ct. 1938), 14 N. E. (2d) 991;
Chrysler Corp. v. International Union, U. A. W. A. (Mich. Cir. Ct.
1937), C. C. H. Labor Law Service, f1 16, 900; Holland v. Minnehoma
Oil U. Gas Co. (Okla. 1939), 89 P. (2d) 764; McNeeley & Price Co. v.
Grabowski (Pa. Ct. of Common Pleas, 1937), 1 Lab. Rel. Rep. 544.
"o The Losmar, The Oakmar, and McNeely & Price Co. cases cited
note 119. An amendment to the Pennsylvania anti-injunction act
makes it inapplicable to a labor dispute in which a sit-down strike
has been called. 43 P~urdon's Penn. Stat. Ann., 1939 Cum. Pocket
Part, § 206 d. See note 144, infra.
I' Wis. Stat. (1939), § 111.06 (12).
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a business with which they have a dispute. No modern common
law case questions the legality of this latter means of labor warlaws have
fare, and the Clayton acts and the anti-injunction
22
language exempting it from equitable restraint.
A form of the secondary boycott occurs where a labor
dispute exists between A employer and X union, and X union
calls or threatens a strike against another employer B to cause
B to cease having business relations with A. A frequent instance
of this form of secondary boycott is the refusal by X union to
work on a building (for B contractor) because of a dispute with
the owner of the building or with another contractor (A).
Another variant of this form is X union's advising B employer
that its men will not handle, work or transport goods coming
from or going to A employer with whom X union has a dispute.
This has been called a material boycott. Closely related is a
notice communicated by X union to B employer that its
members will refuse to render services to A employer. The
secondary boycott in its original meaning is applied when X
union informs B that its members will not patronize him so long
as he carries on dealings with A. Mlany common law decisions
may be cited enjoining these activities, 12 3 but most of them may
be explained on the ground that unlawful purposes were sought
Note 10 supra; one-half or more of the anti-injunction laws

expressly exempt the simple boycott from equitable process; e. g.,

Wis. Stat. (1939), § 193.53(f).
'= Strike or threat of strike against B; Central Metal Products
Corp. v. O'Brien (Dist. Ct. 1922), 278 F. 827; R. and W. Hat Shop, Inc.
v. Sculley (1922), 98 Conn. 1, 118 A. 55; Swing v. American Federation of Labor (Ill. App. Ct. 1938), 18 N. E. (2d) 258 (refusal to perform services for A); Burnham v. Dowd (1914), 217 Mass. 351, 104
N. E. 841; W. A. Snow Iron Works v. Chadwick (1917), 227 Mass.
382, 116 N. E. 801; Picket v. Walsh (1906), 192 Mass. 572, 78 N. E.
753; United Union Brewing Co. v. Beck (Wash. 1939), 93 P. (2d)
772; Thacker Coal Co. v. Burke (1906), 59 W. Va. 253, 53 S. E. 161.
Refusal to work on same building on which plaintiff A has contract or which plaintiff A owns: Blandford v. Duthie (1925), 147 Md.
388, 128 A. 138; Erdman v. Mitchell (1903), 207 Pa. 79, 56 A. 327;
Patterson v. Bldg. Trades Council (1902), 11 Pa. Dist. R. 500.
Refusal to handle goods going to or from A: Burnham v. Dowd;

W. A. Snow Iron Works v. Chadwick; United Union Brewing Co. v.
Beck; all cited supra; Purris v. Local No. 500 U. B. C. U. (1906), 214
Pa. 348, 63 A. 585.

Threat not to patronize B: Hopkins v. Oxley Stove Co. (C. C. A.,

8th, 1897), 83 F. 912; Seattle Brewing & Malting Co. v. Hansen

(C. C. A., 9th, 1905), 194 F. 1011; Wilson v. Hey (1908), 232 Ill. 309,
83 N. E. 928; Barr v. Essex Trades Council (1894), 53 N. J. Eq. 101,

30 A. 881; Fink & Son v. Butchers' Union No. 422 (1915), 84 N. J.

Eq. 638, 95 A. 182.

KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL

or on the ground that other modes of labor warfare were so
tortiously carried as to warrant a blanket injunction. Where
the secondary boycott is concerned, there seems to be a noticeable tendency to include it within the terms of the injunction
where unlawful picketing or intimidation has occurred.
Another reason which occasionally appears for injunction in
these cases is that these forms of the secondary boycott cause B
to breach his contract with A.124 Nevertheless, the preponderance of opinion at common law today in a case in which no unlawful purpose or method of warfare appears is that the activ12
ities here described will not be enjoined. 5
Section 20 of the Clayton Act forbids injunction against
ceasing to perform any work or persuading others not to
patronize any party to a dispute, and it would seem that the
activities described above are exempt from injunction. 28
But in the federal courts only employees in the immediate
employment relation could claim the exemptions of § 20.127
Consequently, X union which struck against B to cause cessation of dealings with A was obliged to claim the lawfulness of
' Central Metal Products Corp. v. O'Brien; Ran W Hat Shop,
Inc. v. Scully; Blandford v. Duthie, Thacker Coal Co. v. Burke; all
cited note 123.
'Refusal to work on same building on which plaintiff A has
contract or which plaintiff A owns: Gill Engraving Co. v. Doerr (Dist.
Ct. 1914), 214 F. 111; Meier v. Speer (1910), 96 Ark. 618, 132 S. W.
988; McKay v. Retail Automobile Salesmen's L. U. No. 1067 (Calif.
1940), 106 P. (2d) 373; Parkinson Co. v. Building Trades Council
(1908) 154 Cal. 581, 98 P. 1027; John & R. Elec. Co. v. Bricklayers
Local U. No. 1 (1917), 92 Conn. 161, 101 A. 659; Gray v. Bldg. Trades
Council (1903), 91 Minn. 171, 97 N. W. 663; National P. Ass'n of
Steam Fitters v. Cumming (1902), 170 N. Y. 315, 63 N. E. 369; Lundorf-Bicknell Co. v. Smith (1927), 24 Ohio App. 294, 156 N. E. 243.
Refusal to handle goods going to or from A: McKay v. Retail
Automobile Salesmen's L. U. No. 1067; Parkinson Co. v. Building
Trades Council; Cohn & R. Elec. Co. v. Bricklayers Local U. No. 1;
all cited supra; Iron Molders Union v. Allis Chalmers Co. (C. C. A.,
7th, 1908), 166 F. 45; Smith Metropolitan Co. v. Lyons (Calif. 1940),
106 P. (2d) 414; Smythe Neon Sign Co. v. Local Union No. 405 (Iowa,
1939), 284 N. W. 126; Crescent Plaining Mill Co. v. Mueller (St. Louis
Ct. of Appeals, Mo., 1939), 123 S. W. (2d) 193; Bossert v. Dhuys
(1917), 221 N. Y. 342, 117 N. E. 582.
Threat not to patronize B; Iron Molder's Union v. Allis Chalmers
Co., supra; Pierce v. Stablemen's Union (1909), 156 Cal. 70, 103 P.
324; Lindsay & Co. v. Montana Federation of Labor (1908), 37 Mont.
264, 96 P. 127.
'Note
10, supra; see Illinois and federal cases cited notes 123,
124, and 125. Direct authority without the complicating factors of
unlawful purpose and picketing is meager.
I See text at note 60, supra.
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the activity under the common law and anti-trust laws. And
28
Under the
under the latter X union was frequently enjoined.1
anti-injunction laws the legality of all these forms of the
secondary boycott seems established. A labor dispute exists,
and the defendants are parties who can claim the exemptions of
the legislation.1 29
Occasionally these forms of the secondary boycott are
carried on not by X union but by a related or allied union Y.
Thus, Y union may refuse to work for B employer, or may
refuse to handle goods coming from A employer, in order to
compel B employer to cease having business relations with A.
All this may be done indirectly to exert pressure on A to yield
to the demands of X union which is related to Y union. The
conclusions which were reached above remain the same although
the situation now takes on the appearance of a sympathetic
strike. However, the sympathetic or general strike, which is
generally regarded as unlawful, is that which is called by a
large number of unrelated unions having no common interest
and which ties up industry generally.' 30 On the other hand, if
Y union is employed by A employer along with X union and Y
union goes out on strike with X union in order to attain the
latter's lawful objectives, this is entirely lawful. Any other
conclusion would be to give to a single industrial union in a
shop an advantage and privilege which would be denied to
craft unions working in another similar shop.
See text at note 141, infra.

Levering & Garrigues Co. v. Morrin (C. C. A., 2nd, 1934), 71 F.
(2d) 284 (X union refuses to work on buildings with plaintiff contractor); Pauly Jail Bldg. Co. v. International Ass'n (Dist. Ct. 1939),
29 F. Supp. 15 (refusal to work for contractors dealing with A or

receiving A's products), Southeastern Motor Lines v. Hoover Truck
Co. (Dist. Ct. 1940), 34 F. Supp. 390 (refusel to handle goods going to
or from A); International Brotherhood v. International U. (C. C. A.,
9th, 1939), 106 F. (2d) 871 (same); United Electrical R. & Mach.
Workers v. I. B. of E. Workers (C. C. A., 2nd, 1940), 115 F. (2d) 488
(same); Denver Local Union No. 13 v. Perry Truck Lines (Colo.
1940), 101 P. (2d) 436 (refusal to work for employers contracting
with A); General Bottle Co. v. Oneto (Sup. Ct. 1939), 12 N. Y. S.
(2d) 348 (refusal to handle A's goods); § 206f of the Pennsylvania
law (all forms).
'- See Colorado Wyoming Express v. Denver Local Union (Dist.
Ct. 1940), 35 F. Supp. 155; Central Metal Products Corp. v. O'Brien
(Dist. Ct. 1922), 278 F. 827; Auburn Draying Co. v. Wardell (1919),
227 N. Y. 1, 124 N. E. 97; Wis. Stat. (1939), § 111.06 (2) (g) ("provided . . . nothing herein shall prevent sympathetic strikes in
support of those in similar occupations working for other employees
in the same craft"); Rotwein on Labor Law, §§ 33, 34.
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A form of the secondary boycott which has come into
prominence and which deserves separate consideration is
secondary picketing. This takes place where X union having
a labor difficulty and strike against A employer pickets B
employer to induce him to cease dealing with A. In nearly all
the cases none of B's employees strike, and the common law
rule, as well as the rule under the Clayton acts, is clear that
13
This result
injunction will issue at the suit of either A or B. is reached because the common law courts are unwilling that
means be used to draw non-combatants into the affray. Sometimes an added reason for the injunction is that the secondary
picketing causes B to breach his contract with A. Frequently
in the decisions, as is true of the secondary boycott cases
generally, appear other factors which might of themselves be
sufficient to sustain an injunction: unlawful purposes or violent
conduct. Where B sues for injunction, it is to be noticed that
a picketing without strike case exists as to him, and this is
enough for equity to act at common law and under the Clayton
acts.' 32 Where some of B's employees strike, a case of picketing
and strike to cause B not to deal with A exists, to be decided on
an appraisal of the lawfulness of purpose. It is likely that the
holding under the common law would be in favor of injunction
because the purpose and method are part and parcel of an
illegal secondary boycott 8 3 .
Under the anti-injunction acts there are many decisions
decreeing injunctive relief on the ground that the legislation
"A obtains injunction: Meadowmoor Dairies v. Milk Wagon
Driver's Union (Ill. 1939), 21 N. E. (2d) 308; Maywood Farms Co. v.

Milk Wagon Drivers Union (Ill. App. Ct. 1939), 22 N. E. (2d) 962;
Evening Times Printing & Publishing Co. v. American Newspaper
Guild (N. J. Ct. of Errors and Appeals, 1938), 124 N. J. Eq. 71, 199
A. 598; Van Buskirk v. Sign Painters Local No. 1231, (N. J. Ct. of
Errors and Appeals, 1940), 14 A. (2d) 45; United Union Brewery Co.
v. Beck (Wash. 1939), 93 P. (2d) 772; Parker Paint & Wafl Paper Co.
v. Local Union No. 813 (1921), 87 W. Va. 631, 105 S. E. 911. Contra:
Pierce v. Stablemen's Union (1909), 156 Cal. 70, 103 P. 324; Smythe
Neon Sign Co. v. Local Union No. 405 (Iowa, 1939), 284 N. W. 126.

B obtaineds injunction: Evening Times Printing &Publishing Co.
v. American Newspaper Guild (N. J. Ch. 1937), 195 A. 378; Carpenters and Joiners Union v. Ritter's Cafe (Tex. Civ. App. 1940), 138
S. W. (2d) 223; International Ass'n v. Federated Ass'n (Tex. Civ.
App. 1937), 109 S. W. (2d) 301. Contra: Fortenbury v. Superior Ct.
(Calif. 1940), 106 P. (2d( 411.
See text at notes 54 and 55, supra.
11 Such is the case of Carpenters and Joners Union v. Ritter's
Cafe, cited note 131, supra.
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does not exempt secondary picketing but leaves its legal status
as at common law' 34. Recognition has been given that secondary
picketing is different from ordinary picketing, and it is argued
that the prohibition of the anti-injunction acts is against
restraint on picketing of the employer (A) with whom the unoin
(X) has a labor dispute. The terms of the anti-injunction laws
are broad, however, and it is difficult to avoid the legislative
command that no injunction issue against giving publicity to
the facts involved in any labor dispute whether by patrolling or
any other method not involving fraud or violence'3 5 . Consequently, there is a strong line of authority following a leading
New York case 136 which denies injunction where there is a unity
of interest between A and B. "Unity of interest" is found if
B retails A's goods or services and thus gives economic aid to
A in the latter's struggle with X union. It is likely that no
unity of interest will be found if B is a private citizen and
possibly if B does not retail the specific goods or service sold by
A.1:3 7 The New York decision spoken of further qualifies the
privilege of secondary picketing by requiring that the signs
and placards carried give notice that A's product is picketed
"4A obtains injunction: Yellow Cab 0. Co. v. Taxicab Drivers
Local U. Co. No. 889 (Dist. Ct. 1940), 35 F. Supp. 403; Grandview
Dairy v. O'Leary (1936) 285 N. Y. S. 841, 158 Misc. 791.
B obtains injunction: Muncie Building Trades Council v. Umbar-

ger (Ind. 1938), 17 N. E. (2d) 828; Wiest v. Dirks (Ind. 1939), 20
N. E. (2d) 969; Canepa v. John Doe (1938), 277 N. Y. 52, 12 N. E.
(2d) 790; People v. Bellows (1939), 281 N. Y. 67, 22 N. E. (2d) 238

(criminal prosecution); Silvergate v. Kirkman (Sup. Ct. 1939), 12

N. Y. S. (2d) 505; Well & Co., Inc. v. John Doe (1938), 5 N. Y. S. (2d)
559; Mlle. Reif, Inc. v. Randau (1937), 1 N. Y. S. (2d) 515.
Some of these cases are affected by unlawful purposes and by
the fact that the picketing causes B to breach his contract with A.
"'Note 15, supra.
" Goldfinger v. Feintuch (1937), 276 N. Y. 281, 11 N. E. (2d)
910 (B fails to secure injunction). Accord: Consolidated Terminal
Corp. v. Drivers, etc., Union (D. of C., 1939), 33 F. Supp. 645; Johnson
v. Milk Drivers & Dairy Employees Union (La. 1940), 195 So. 791.
Accord where A fails to secure injunction: Milk Wagon Drivers'
Union v. Lake Valley F. Products (1940), 61 S. Ct. 122, reversing 108
F. (2d) 436; Wilson & Co. v. Birl (C. A. A., 3rd, 1939), 105 F. (2d)
948; Denver Local Union No. 13 v. Perry Truck Lines (Colo. 1940),
101 P. (2d) 436; Baillis v. Fuchs (1940), 283 N. Y. 133, 27 N. E. (2d)
812; cases cited note 138 infra.
'1 See cases cited note 134, supra, particularly Muncie Building
Trades Council v. Umbarger, People v. Bellows, Canepa v. John Doe,
and Silvergate v. Kirkman.
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against. But this qualification does not seem always to have
been adhered to in later cases. 138
The varying methods of labor warfare having been
examined, there remains one circumstance which may cause any
one of them to be enjoined apart from the operation of an antiinjunction law. If a labor activity violates the anti-trust laws
or restrains inter-state commerce, it is subject to restraint. 13 9
Section 20 of the Clayton Act, being a part of the anti-trust law,
forbids injunction against the activities itemized in such a way
as to exclude the implication of exception in the case of a breach
of the anti-trust laws. But the class of persons who were able
to claim the exemptions of § 20 was so small' 40 that injunctions
issued freely against any form of labor warfare which restrained
interstate commerce. 14 ' The secondary boycott (by strike or
refusal to handle goods) was often enjoined because it restrained
interstate commerce and because it was carried on by persons
who could not claim the exemptions of § 20. Thus, it was not
clear that the secondary boycott of this type was illegal in the
federal courts apart from the anti-trust laws although the
language of several of the dicisions indicated disapproval.
The federal anti-injunction law was enacted to extend the
exemptions from equitable restraint. So wide is the class of
persons who can claim the exemption and so unequivocal and
without exception are the prohibitions against restraint on the
!Manhattan Steam Baker, Inc. v. Schindler (1937), 250 App.
Div. 467, 294 N. Y. S. 783; Davega-City Radio, Inc. v. Randau (Sup.
Ct. 1937), 1 N. Y. S. (2d) 514.
The qualification was followed in Johnson v. Milk Drivers and
Dairy Employee's Union, cited note 136, supra.
I' Cases cited note 141, infra; Thomas v. Cincinnati, N. 0. &
T. P. R. Co. (1894), 62 F. 803; United States v. Railway Employees'
Dept. A. F. L. (Dist. Ct. 1922), 282 F. 479.

0See text at note 60, supra.
Mine Workers of America v. Coronado Coal Co. (1922),
259 U. S. 344, 42 S. Ct. 570, later proceedings (1925), 268 U. S. 295,
45 S. Ct. 551 (picketing); Loewe v. Lawlor (1908), 208 U. S. 274, 28
S. Ct. 301, further proceedings (1915) 235 U. S. 522, 35 S. Ct. 170
"I United

(secondary boycott); Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering (1921),
254 U. S. 443, 41 S. Ct. 172 (secondary boycott); Bedford Cut Stone
Co. v. Journeymen Stone Cutter's Ass'n (1927), 274 U. S. 27, 47 S. Ct.

522 (secondary boycott); Aeolian Company v. Fisher (C. C. A., 2nd,
1930), 40 F. (2d) 189 (secondary boycott); International Organization, U. M. W. A. v. Red Jacket Consolidated Coal and Coke Co.
(C. C. A., 4th, 1927), 18 F. (2d) 839 (picketing); United States
Gypsum Co. v. Heslop (Dist. Ct. 1930), 39 F. (2d) 228 (secondary
boycott).
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activities itemized that it is now settled that injunction will be
on
denied against strike, picketing and the secondary boycott
14 2 Howlaw.
anti-trust
the
violate
they
that
the sole ground
ever, statutory damages may yet be sought on the statement of
143
a proper case.
IV
A survey of the cases demonstrates that the rights and
privileges of labor have expanded considerably during the past
century. Gradually at first under the common law but with
celerity during the last decade purposes and methods of labor
warfare approved by the courts have increased in number and
scope. At common law legal purposes were confined to better
wages and hours and other closely related objectives. With the
enlarged definition of labor dispute found in § 20 of the Clayton
Act, it was labor's hope that the purpose of the closed shop and
warfare carried on by unions and persons outside the immediate
employment relationship should be exempt from injunction so
long as the methods remained peaceful. When the courts
restricted the exemptions of § 20 to a narrow group of persons
within the immediate employment relation only and proclaimed
that as to all others the common law and anti-trust act were
applicable and basis for injunction, the response from labor was
agitation for real anti-injunction legislation. For the main part
the anti-injunction laws enacted by Congress and by some fifteen
of the states are just that. The class of parties who may claim
their exemptions and the definition of labor dispute are so
broad as to protect a wide variety of purposes for which
organizations outside the employment relation may wage labor
warfare. Neither picketing without strike nor restraint of
interstate commerce is circumstance sufficient for injunction to
issue. Only purposes flagrantly unrelated to a union's welfare
"I Milk Wagon Drivers' Union v. Lake Valley F. Products (1940),
61 S. Ct. 122, reversing 108 F. (2d) 436 (secondary picketing of retail

customers of plaintiff not enjoined though in restraint of commerce);

Wilson & Co. v. Birl (C. C. A., 3rd, 1939), 105 F. (2d) 948; Pauly
Jail Bldg. Co. v. International Ass'n (Dist. Ct. 1939), 29 F. Supp. 15;
Houston & North Texas M. F. Lines v. Local Union No. 886 (Dist.
Ct. 1938), 24 F. Supp. 619. Earlier federal cases in the lower courts
were contra: May v. Dean (C. C. A., 5th, 1936), 82 F. (2d) 554; Lake
Charles Stevedores v. Mayo (Dist. Ct. 1935) 20 F. Supp. 698; Fehr
Baking Co. v. Bakers' Union (Dist. Ct. 1937), 20 F. Supp. 691.
I"'Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader (1940), 310 U. S. 469, 60 S. Ct. 982.

This case contains a full exposition of what is restraint of commerce
so far as union activities are concerned.

IENTucKY LAW JOURNAL

and methods of warfare of the secondary boycott type are
enjoined; even then the courts have difficulty in avoiding the
terms of the acts. When a case properly appears for injunction, the procedural requirements are detailed if not burdensome
in the interest of preserving to the labor organization the utmost
of its rights. It may be observed, too, that this legislation and
decisions thereunder have had their influence in causing courts
in jurisdictions without these laws to become more liberal in
their attitudes toward labor warfare.
During the last two years a reaction has set in. Picketing
without strike has occurred in some instances without justification, and the secondary boycott in -its extreme manifestations
has excited unfavorable comment. The sit-down strike and the
spectacle of industry tied up by inter-union disputes have done
much to stimulate a feeling that labor should not be uncurbed
in its activities. As a result legislation has been enacted making
the sit-down strike an unfair labor practice under the labor
relations acts and declaring that the anti-injunction law shall
have no application to it.'" The secondary boycott in all or
some of its forms has been made an unfair labor practice and
subject to restraint. 145 The inter-union dispute has received
special legislative attention and the anti-injunction law made
inapplicable. 14 6 Picketing without strike has been limited in
number of pickets, 147 and, more seriously for labor, a strike called
without statutory notice has been made an unfair labor practice
and misdemeanor. 148 Another type of restriction forbids labor
warfare other than strike unless a majority of employees have
voted for the strike. 149 Still another type forbids picketing
14 Mass. Ann. Laws (Supp. 1937), ch. 150A, § 8; Mich. Laws 1939,
Public Act No. 176, § 15; Minn. Laws 1939, ch. 440, §§ 11(c), 14; 43
Purdon's Penn. Stat. Ann., 1939 Cum. Pocket Part, §§ 206d, 211.6;
Wis. Stat. (1939), § 111.06(2) (h).
' Minn. Laws 1939, ch. 440, § 11(f), 13, 14; Ore. Laws 1939, ch. 2;
Wis. Stat. (1939), §§ 103.535, 111.06 (2) (g).
"'Ore. Laws 1939, ch. 2; 43 Purdon's Penn. Stat. Ann., 1939 Cum.
Pocket Part, § 206d.
" 'Minn. Laws 1939, ch. 440, §§ 11 (e), 14.
"Mich. Laws 1939, Public Act No. 176, §§ 9, 9a; Minn. Laws
1939, ch. 440, § 6; Wis. Stat. (1939), § 111.11.
149 Ore. Laws 1939, ch. 2; 43 Purdon's Penn. Stat. Ann., 1939 Cum.
Pocket Part, § 206d (where purpose is closed shop); Wis. Stat. (1939),
§§ 111.06(2) (e), 103.62(3). The Oregon law was held unconstitutional in American Federation of Labor v. Bain (1940), 106 P. (2d)

544. Contrariwise, the Wisconsin court sustained its act; Hotel &
Restaurant E. I. A. v. Wisconsin E. R. Board (1940), 294 N. W. 632.
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unless a majority of the pickets are strikers. 150 Finally, amendment has been made to some of the labor relations laws so that
no union or employee shall have their benefit if it or he has
been guilty of unfair labor practices as defined. 151 These
restrictions are all indications that the legislative mind is
becoming impatient with some forms of union activity.
The lesson for labor is plain. If labor has striven long and
arduously for legislative curbs on the labor injunction, to retain
these benefits it must undertake to discipline its own ranks as
to excesses which are not liable to equitable restraint. The interunion dispute, trespasses of flagrant character, violence, and
labor warfare for obscure reasons (including some picketing
without strike cases) should be avoided. Otherwise a day may
come when labor's gains will be lost in a reform not to its liking.

I Minn. Laws 1939, ch. 440, § 11 (d).
u Minn. Laws 1939, ch. 440, § 15; 43 Purdon's Penn. Stat. Ann.,
1939 Cum. Pocket Part, § 211.10.1; Wis. Stat. (1939), §§ 111.01-111.20.

KENTUCKY
Volume XXIX

LAW

JOURNAL

May, 1941

Number 4

Published four times a year by the College of Law, University of
Kentucky: Issued in November, January, March, and May.
Subscription Price $2.50 per year ...................................

$1.00 per number

EDITORIAL BOARD
1940-1941
FACULTY OF THE COLLEGE OF LAW, EX OFFICIO
ROY MORELAND, Faculty Editor
W. L. MATTHEWS, JR., Editor-in-Chief
J. GRANVILLE CLARK, Associate Editor
EUGENE R. WEBB, Managing Editor
HARRY W. ROBERTS, JR., BUSMESS MANAGER
MARY BARTON
JOHfN H. CLARKE, JR.
CLARENCE CORNELIUS
GLENN DENHAM
ROBERT L. HENRY

HOWARD E. TRENT, JR.
ROY VANCE, JR.
ROBERT T. SWEENEY
JOE JOHNSON, JR.

ADVISORY BOARD FROM THE STATE BAR ASSOCIATION
ROBERT HATTON, Louisville Chairman
Term Expires 1942
STANLEY, Frankfort
RICHARD STOLL, Lexington
HARRY B. MACKOY, Covington
H. CHURCH FORD, Georgetown
ROBERT HENSLEY, Frankfort
JOHN C. DOOLAN, Louisville
LAFON ALLEN, Louisville
HENDERSON DYSARD, Ashland
J. N. LOTT, JR., Louisville
COLEMAN WRIGHT, Shelbyville
H. C. GILLIS, Williamsburg
OSSO W.

K. L. J.-7

Term Expires 1941
MAC SWINFORD, Cynthiana
W. H. FULTON, Frankfort
JAMES CAMMACK, Frankfort

RoY SHELBOURNE, Paducah
JOE L. PRICE, Paducah
PETTUS WHITE, Hopkinsvflle
THOMAS BALLANTINE, Louisville
ERNEST WOODWARD, Louisville
EDWARD HUMPHEEY, Louisville
CHARLES WYLIE, Lexington
CHESTER ADAMS, Lexington

